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CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY LAW: TIME TO TURN BACK
FROM AN EVER EXPANDING, EVER MORE TROUBLING AREA'
by Paul Marcus**
"[C]onspiracy, that darling of the modem prosecutor's
nursery."
Learned Hand'
"We judges ought to take judicial notice of what
every ordinary person knows about juries, and
therefore to recognize that the twelve citizens,
casually summoned to serve as jurors, are not trained
fact-finders and can be easily bewildered .... The
need for safeguarding defendants from
misunderstanding by the jury is peculiarly acute in
conspiracy trials .. "
Jerome Frank2
I. INTRODUCTION
Concerns about the crime of conspiracy have been around for a long time. After
all, the statements by Judges Hand and Frank were made, respectively, about seventy and
fifty years ago. My own concerns regarding conspiracy began to surface almost twenty
years ago. It was hard to focus students' direction in this body of the law; it was
extremely difficult to explore in class the interplay between the practical, legal and policy
issues which surfaced so often in conspiracy cases.
©Paul Marcus, 1992
R. Hugh and Nolie A. Haynes Visiting Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; Professor
of Law, University of Arizona. I thank Professors Walter Felton and Linda Malone of the College of
William and Mary, John Nowak of the University of Illinois, Sarah Welling of the University of Kentucky,
and David Wexler of the University of Arizona for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this
article. The support provided by the University of Arizona for research conducted during the summer of
1991 is acknowledged with gratitude.
I Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
2 United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773
(1943).
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In 1977 I completed a project which involved visits to more than a dozen cities,
interviews of over 100 judges and practicing lawyers, and the distribution of
questionnaires to thousands of others. The exclusive focus points of this project were the
crime of conspiracy and the way in which that crime was prosecuted and defended in the
United States. The results of this study were published in the Georgetown Law Journal,3
and remain today, I believe, the only detailed look at conspiracy law that combines both
an analytical framework and an empirical look at the area.4
It has now been more than fifteen years since that study was completed. Certainly
many of the issues which were vital then have remained so. During this period, however,
remarkable activity in the law has occurred concerning criminal conspiracy. No one fifteen
to twenty years ago predicted, or could have predicted, the massive and complex "mega-
trials" that are common today, the major impact of the drug conspiracy laws, or the
dramatic structuring by the Supreme Court of the rules of evidence in conspiracy cases.
It is my purpose in this article to consider how far we have traveled during the past two
decades in the prosecution and defense of conspiracy cases. The article will consider
where we were then, where we are now, and - most significantly - the direction to
which we should be turning as we approach the 21st century.
Not only the law has changed during the past two decades. Major changes also
have occurred in the opportunity to obtain funding to conduct empirical and analytical
research. Thus, unable to obtain funds to duplicate the earlier empirical analysis, 5 I have
turned to written communication with judges, attorneys and legal educators to have a more
complete sense of the current conditions. Many of these individuals have been kind
enough to allow the use of their responses in this article, so that the reader will see not
only an author's analysis of the state of the law and the practice, but also the views of
some outstanding, seasoned observers and participants in the legal justice system.
3 Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEO. L.J. 925
(1977) [hereinafter Marcus, Conspiracy]. There had been considerable hope at that time that a proposed
revised federal criminal code would become a reality and would dramatically alter and restructure the crime
of conspiracy. Alas, reforms in the area have been piecemeal and have moved away from issues such as
conspiracy, white collar crime, and entrapment law. See generally Paul Marcus, The Proposed Federal
Criminal Code, 1978 U. ILL. L. FORUM 379; Louis B. Schwartz, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws:
Issues, Tactics and Prospects, 1977 DUKE L.J. 171.
4 Some outstanding work has been done in the area, but with a different focus or form of analysis.
See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Conspiracy and Multi-Venue in Federal Criminal Prosecutions: The Crime
Committed Formula, 9 UCLA L. REV. 751 (1962); Developments in the Law -- Criminal Conspiracy, 72
HARV. L. REV. 920 (1959); David B. Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
189 (1972); Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959);
Albert J. Hamo, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624 (1941); Phillip E. Johnson, The
Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1973); Christopher B. Mueller, The Federal
Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323 (1984); Francis B.
Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922); Shirley A. Selz, Conspiracy Law in Theory and
in Practice: Federal Conspiracy Prosecutions in Chicago, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 35 (1977); Herbert Wechsler,
et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt,
Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (1961).
5 That earlier project had been funded jointly by the National Science Foundation and the Program in
Law and Society, University of Illinois.
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II. CONSPIRACY LAW THEN
A. Bases for the Crime
The rationale given for having the crime of conspiracy has not changed at all
during the entire century. "Criminal conspiracy[,J ... an agreement between two or more
persons formed for the purpose of committing a crime,"6 serves two distinct purposes.
The first is inchoate: "[I]t serves a preventive function by stopping criminal conduct in
its early stages of growth before it has a full opportunity to bloom."7 While this purpose
is regularly offered to explain the presence of the crime, the earlier survey results support
the widely held view that the crime rarely is treated as an inchoate offense. That is, most
charged conspiracies involve situations in which an attempted or completed "substantive
offense" (the object of the agreement) has taken place. To be sure, in most of these cases
the government only finds out about the underlying conspiracy because that object crime
has been completed or at least attempted.8
The real reason for the conspiracy crime is the belief that serious group danger
is present in the usual conspiracy situation.' Our system proceeds on the assumption that
the law of conspiracy "protects society from the dangers of concerted criminal
activity. ' Stated succinctly, "[w]e punish conspiracy because joint action is, generally,
more dangerous than individual action."'' Although it has been challenged by some,'2
6 Marcus, Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 928.
7 United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 470 (2d Cir. 1991) (Wallach is the well-known Wedtech
prosecution, on appeal). Certainly the inchoate nature of the conspiracy offense could be a major force, as it
allows for criminalization of acts well before any other inchoate crime, even attempt. "[E]very criminal con-
spiracy is not an attempt. One may become guilty of conspiracy long before his act has come so dangerously
near to completion as to make him criminally liable for the attempted crime." Sayre, supra note 4, at 399.
8 As indicated in the 1977 survey, an extremely small number of conspiracy charges would be present
not in connection with some other substantive completed (or attempted) offense. See Marcus, Conspiracy,
supra note 3, at 936.
9 This is the reason typically given for why conspiracy is treated apart from other offenses so that
different rules apply concerning consecutive sentencing, greater punishment for the conspiracy than the
completed offense, double jeopardy, and so forth. See generally United States v. Inafuku, 938 F.2d 972, 974
(9th Cir. 1991).
10 Wallach, 935 F.2d at 470.
11 United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1991).
12 The chief critic has been Professor Goldstein of the Yale Law School. In a well-cited article he
pointed out the risk of simply believing that this added danger was necessarily present with collective
activity:
Though these assumed dangers from conspiracy have a romantically individualistic
ring, they have never been verified empirically. It is hardly likely that a search for
such verification would end in support of Holdsworth's suggestion that combination
alone is inherently dangerous. This view is immediately refuted by reference to our
own society, which is grounded in organization and agreement. More likely, empirical
investigation would disclose that there is as much reason to believe that a large
number of participants will increase the prospect that the plan will be leaked as that it
will be kept secret; or that the persons involved will share their uncertainties and
dissuade each other as that each will stiffen the other's determination. Most probably,
however, the factors ordinarily mentioned as warranting the crime of conspiracy would
be found to add to the danger to be expected from a group in certain situations and not
in others; the goals of the group and the personalities of its members would make any
generalization unsafe and hence require some other explanation for treating conspiracy
as a separate crime in all cases.
Goldstein, supra note 4, at 414.
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this notion has been fully accepted on many occasions by the Supreme Court and by
judges and practicing lawyers throughout the United States.' 3
Acceptance of the rationale of group danger does not wholly dispose of the
concerns regarding the need for this particular crime. That is, assuming criminal group
behavior really is more dangerous than individual criminal activity, 4 is it necessary to
have the crime of conspiracy to combat such behavior, or would other offenses be able
to deal with the problem? Without question, the vast majority of offenses brought under
the conspiracy doctrine could be handled effectively by other, more traditional theories.
The Florida Supreme Court stated the matter well:
We recognize that the charge of conspiracy is an excellent tool in
combating organized crime, but the use of this charge has been
expanded to dragnet proportions in some instances. Of course, the law
of criminal attempt is sufficient to protect society against the danger of
incipient wrongdoers. Also, if several join in the commission of a
criminal act, the prosecutor could rely on the basic rule that one who
counsels, commands, induces, procures or aids and abets another in
committing a crime is punishable as a principal defendant. These
alternatives are available and could be used in lieu of a conspiracy
charge. "
13 See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-594 (1961):
[C]ollective criminal agreement -- partnership in crime -- presents a greater potential
threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both increases the
likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the
probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.
Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the
attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could accomplish.
Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which
it has embarked. Combination in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes
unrelated to the original purpose for which the group is formed. In sum, danger which
a conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive offense which is the immedi-
ate aim of the enterprise.
Id.; see also United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915):
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause to be
committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the gravest character,
sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of the
contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and
preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is
characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its
discovery, and adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered.
Id.
As stated by one state prosecutor: "The good reason for having the crime of conspiracy is to get
the serious and dangerous planners of crime, when there is more than one person planning the act." Marcus,
Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 933 (interview with Florence Linn, Assistant Project Administrator, Bureau of
Special Operations, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (July 16, 1975)).
14 This is an assumption about which, after reading literally thousands of conspiracy cases and being
involved in both the prosecutions and defenses of numerous such matters, I have very serious doubts. Still,
it is the prevailing assumption.
15 Goldberg v. State, 351 So.2d 332, 334 (Fla. 1977).
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The argument for added danger for conspiracies has never been supported by any
sort of empirical data, and thus it is extremely difficult to justify the presence of the
crime, at least in situations where other offenses could be charged.16 Twenty years ago
Professor Phillip Johnson, in an incisive article, forcefully argued this view:
Conspiracy gives the courts a means of deciding difficult questions
without thinking about them. The basic objection to the doctrine is not
simply that many of its specific rules are bad, but rather that all of them
are ill-considered. The first step towards improving a rule of law is to
consider the policies it serves. The specific rules of conspiracy,
however, are derived more from the logic of an abstract concept than
from any realistic assessment of the needs of law enforcement or the
legitimate interests of criminal defendants. We need to reconsider the
problem of group crime without being distracted by the abstractions that
the concept of conspiracy always seems to introduce.
Abolition of conspiracy is not an idea whose time has come,
because law enforcement interests erroneously regard the doctrine as a
vital weapon against organized crime and because critics of conspiracy
have attacked it piecemeal rather than in its entirety. This Article is
therefore addressed more to the law reformers of the future than to
those of the present, and its aim is not so much to settle an argument
as to start one.1
7
The arguments challenging the need for the conspiracy charge may have
considerable force. The basis for the charge, however, appears unshaken and unshakable.
Professor Johnson, in a recent letter to the author, lamented the current situation by noting
that "[tihe outstanding fact is of course that the law has moved in precisely the opposite
direction from that which I recommended in my long-ago article."' 8 Instead of
widespread criticism of the charge or concerns regarding the basis for it, broadly-stated
support appears. A case from the Seventh Circuit is a typical example:
"[W]hat makes the joint action of a group of n persons more fearsome
than the individual actions of those n persons is the division of labor
and the mutual psychological support that collaboration affords." Both
the conspiracy and the market transaction are agreements, but only
conspiracy poses the added danger of group action. True, aiding and
abetting presupposes the existence of more than one actor, but aiders
and abettors are already punished as principals. To justify imposing
additional criminal liability, there must be some additional evidence that
their actions are intended to bring about the object of the conspiracy.
Conspiracies, which are really "agreements to agree" on the multitude
of decisions and acts necessary to successfully pull off a crime, pose an
16 And that, of course, is the case in the vast majority of criminal prosecutions in which conspiracy is
charged. See Marcus, Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 947-48.
17 Johnson, supra note 4, at 1188.
18 Letter from Phillip E. Johnson, Professor of Law, University of California, to author (Jan. 25, 1991)
(on file with author).
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additional risk that the object of the conspiracy will be achieved, and so
warrant additional penalties.'9
B. Impact
The presence of a conspiracy count was in 1970, and is today, of great
significance in the criminal justice system. The crime is charged very often; of that there
can be little question. Judge Alfred Goodwin of the Ninth Circuit commented that, while
he did not actually count the number, he thought that in his circuit the court "see[s] about
100 conspiracy appeals a year.' 20 If one factors in the many cases in other circuits, the
many more cases in the district courts and, of course, the enormous number of cases in
the state courts, it becomes clear that the conspiracy crime is an offense of real import. 2 '
In reviewing the many conspiracy cases, one quickly realizes that the charge has
an impact on several different aspects of a prosecution, such as evidentiary considerations
(particularly relating to co-conspirator declarations), 22 sentencing, 23 and venue.24 Let
us look here, however, to two areas that are greatly affected by the presence of a
conspiracy charge: accountability for the crimes of others, and guilt by association. These
two issues have been strongly raised for many years, and they continue to be argued
today.
In virtually every jurisdiction in the United States, a conspirator can be held
responsible for crimes committed by her co-conspirators as long as such crimes were in
furtherance of the agreement and were reasonably foreseeable. 25 The crimes themselves
do not have to have been agreed upon, intended or even discussed. Liability is based upon
a simple negligence standard, reasonable foreseeability. This rule of liability was
established by the Supreme Court in 1946 in Pinkerton v. United States,26 and is applied
in an enormous number of prosecutions. 27 According to many experienced criminal
19 United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1991) (citations and footnote omitted).
20 Letter from Alfred T. Goodwin, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Ciruit, to author (Feb.
8, 1991) (on file with author).
21 The information in the earlier survey also brought out this point. See Marcus, Conspiracy, supra
note 3, at 939 n.53.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 140-68.
23 Because conspiracy is viewed as a truly separate offense, consecutive sentencing for it and for the
object crime has been found to be valid. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). Under
the new federal sentencing guidelines, the presence of the conspiracy charge can be of great significance in
lengthening the term of imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. Inafuku, 938 F.2d 972, 974 (9th Cir.
1991); United States v. Hodges, 935 F.2d 766, 773-74 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d
739, 757-58 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 315 and 112 S.Ct. 323 (1991). See infra text accompanying
notes 197-98.
24 Venue is proper in any district in which any act in furtherance of the conspiracy took place. Hyde
v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912). In this day of far-flung white collar and drug conspiracies, the venue
feature is especially important. See generally United States v. Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 837 (1989); United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Meyers, 847 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1988).
25 A few states do not follow this broad complicity rule. See, e.g., People v. McGee, 399 N.E.2d
1177 (N.Y. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 392 (1980); Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 206 N.E,2d 672, 678-79
(Mass. 1965).
26 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
27 There are far too many prosecutions with reported opinions to mention. For a good sampling of the
Pinkerton rule in the federal courts, see United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Spudic, 795 F.2d 1334, 1339 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 847
(llth Cir. 1985).
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lawyers, this Pinkerton doctrine is of vital importance. Jeffrey Weiner, President of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (with 25,000 members) writes that:
[T]he Pinkerton doctrine permits the government to hold a defendant
criminally responsible for all reasonably foreseeable acts of co-
conspirators regardless of actual knowledge, intent, or participation.
Thus, if the government cannot prove a defendant's guilt or various
substantive charges, it need only convince the jury of the defendant's
guilt of conspiracy to secure convictions on the otherwise unsupportable
substantive charges.28
The other matter particularly linked to conspiracy relates to guilt by association.
Here, too, complaints have been asserted for decades. Defense counsel would state the
matter in this way: "Juries do not differentiate between individual defendants in large
conspiracy cases." While many judges and prosecutors strongly dispute this view, 9
Weiner, again, sharply makes the argument:
Regarding guilt by association, this may well be the most powerful and
exploited tool the government has to secure criminal convictions. When
the government has one defendant against whom it has a strong case
and one or more defendants against whom it has substantially weaker
cases, a jury may well convict the defendants against whom the
government has little evidence based on its overwhelming belief in the
other defendants' guilt and the relationship of the lesser defendants with
those individuals. In a case where the defendants against whom the
government has its strongest evidence substantially out-number those
against whom it has little or weak evidence, the failure of the jury to
thoroughly sort out the proof and attribute it individually always works
in the government's favor. Additionally, where the government has
uncharged acts evidence or other evidence admissible against only one
or more defendants but inadmissible against others, the government
secures a substantial advantage in the jury's inability to follow
instructions directing it to disregard this evidence as to the other
28 Letter from Jeffrey Weiner, President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, to
author (Feb. 1, 1991) (on file with author). Weiner is not alone in his criticism. See, e.g., the comments of
the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association (policy adopted August 1975) regarding S-I,
the proposed Federal Criminal Code, at 5:
The accepted judicial statement of the rule is that a conspirator is liable for substantive
offenses committed by another conspirator, if the offense was committed in furtherance
of the conspiracy and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy.
The Pinkerton Rule represents a form of vicarious criminal liability that, in
essence, imposes a liability for negligence. In the form of the rule adopted ... a
person is liable for a co-conspirator's crime which was "reasonably foreseeable"; or,
stated another way, the person is criminally liable if he should have known when he
agreed to become a part of the conspiracy, that there was a risk that the collateral
offense would be committed. This is clearly negligence liability, and should be
imposed only if there is strong justification.
We do not support the Pinkerton Rule, which is needed only to punish a
conspirator who never agreed to, aided, or participated in, the commission of the
collateral offense. It goes too far, and does not easily admit of rational application.
Id.
29 Marcus, Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 944-45.
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defendants. Particularly in lengthier and more complicated cases, my
experience is that juries typically throw all the evidence in a blender
and return with a homogenized set of verdicts finding all defendants
guilty.
30
III. CONSPIRACY LAW TODAY
Much of conspiracy law has not changed during the past twenty years, or even
during the past fifty years. The charge has always been common, particularly in the
federal districts. Significant advantages always have flowed from the presence of the
charge.3' The government may still prosecute the alleged conspirators in any district in
which any act is shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have been committed. We
still punish the convicted conspirator severely, and one conspirator remains responsible
for the crimes of co-conspirators. In many fundamental ways, then, the law has remained
both predictable and constant. In several other areas, however, tremendous changes have
occurred which have greatly affected the way in which the crime is charged and the
manner in which defense counsel respond to it. It is to these changes that we now turn.
A. The Far Reach of the Conspiracy Charge
While it is certainly true that in 1952, and even in 1972, one would have had an
easy time finding conspiracy prosecutions in all jurisdictions in the United States, what
we see today is nothing short of a miracle in terms of the number of conspiracy
prosecutions. The charge can be found everywhere. Much of this increase is directly
attributable to the sharp increase in drug prosecutions which most often involve conspiracy
charges. American Bar Association President John Curtin wrote that "[n]arcotics cases in
federal courts increased 229 percent in the last decade and now account for nearly half
of all federal criminal trials. In some state courts, two out of every three criminal cases
involve drugs. Many more are drug-related. '3 2 In a recent letter, Chief Judge Bauer of
the Seventh Circuit explained:
30 Letter from Weiner, supra note 28.
31 The varied advantages were cataloged in United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1388 (7th
Cir.):
First, alleging a single conspiracy enables the government to join a group of defen-
dants together for trial, and joint trials almost always prejudice the rights of individual
defendants to some degree. Some trade-off between prejudice and efficiency is, of
course, necessary for the judicial system to function; otherwise "the slow pace of our
court system would go from a crawl to paralysis." ... Second, and particularly
apposite to this case, by alleging a single conspiracy, the government may invoke the
coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), to admit
evidence against defendants that would otherwise be inadmissible. Statements of any
of the defendants can be used to establish not only the existence of a conspiracy but
also to establish that a particular defendant was a member of the conspiracy .... And
third, coconspirators are liable for the substantive crimes committed by members of the
conspiracy that are in furtherance of the conspiracy. A finding that a defendant joined
a conspiracy therefore exposes that defendant to much more than criminal liability for
joining the conspiracy....
Id.
32 John J. Curtin, Jr., The Crisis in the Criminal Justice System, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 8.
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There has been a substantial increase in the number and complexity of
the conspiracy case; most of this trend is reflected in the drug
prosecutions which have grown wider and wider as the Department of
Justice increases its attention to the "war on drugs." From local
conspiracies, we have grown to national and multinational ring
conspiracies. The department figures on overall criminal cases filed are:
47,043 in 1971 (the last year I was U.S. Attorney) to 66,341 in 1989.
(Those are national figures, of course.) The largest single increase is in
the drug prosecutions and the great bulk of those involve conspiracy
allegations, including RICO counts.33
This change in the growing number of conspiracy prosecutions 34 can be seen
in large cities and small cities, in regions throughout the country, in the federal courts and
in the state courts. Some excerpts from letters written by several judges make the point
clearly. United States Judge Hodges of the Middle District of Florida stated:
I would say that the proliferation of conspiracy prosecutions - or, more
accurately, conspiracy counts - has been encouraged during the last
twenty years by the simplification and clarification of both the
substantive and procedural jurisprudence governing the subject....
In short, as the pleading and proof of conspiracy charges has
become both easier and more familiar for prosecutors (and to the
Courts), the inevitable has come to pass - the use of a conspiracy
count has grown.35
Appellate Judge Frederick Green of the Fourth District of the State of Illinois found: "The
only change I have noted in the prosecution of conspiracy cases in the past 20 years is
the more frequent use of the theory in drug cases."36 United States District Judge Marvin
Aspen from Chicago concluded: "Certainly more conspiracy cases with greater complexity
have been filed in the Northern District of Illinois in each year of the successive eleven
years I have been on the court.
' ' 3
Two federal judges from the District of Arizona, sitting in the southern portion
of the state, described the situation in forceful terms. Judge Richard Bilby commented:
"[There has been] increased use in drug cases, every multi-party drug case, even if it is
two mules packing it across the border, contains a conspiracy count. '"38 The Honorable
Alfredo Marquez wrote:
33 Letter from William J. Bauer, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, to
author (Jan. 29, 1991) (on file with author).
34 Though the growing number can be directly linked to drug prosecutions, there has been a
substantial increase in prosecutions dealing with so-called white collar offenses and gun related offenses,
also. See infra note 41.
35 Letter from William Terrell Hodges, Judge, United States District Court, Middle District of Florida,
to author (Jan. 28, 1991) (on file with author).
36 Letter from Frederick S. Green, Judge, State of Illinois, Appellate Court, Fourth District, to author
(Feb. 1, 1991) (on file with author).
37 Letter from Marvin E. Aspen, Judge, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, to
author (Feb. 12, 1991) (on file with author).
38 Letter from Richard M. Bilby, Judge, United States District Court, District of Arizona, to author
(Feb. 21, 1991) (on file with author).
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I worked as a prosecutor for about three years when Morris Udall was
County Attorney in the middle 50's. I don't recall that a conspiracy
charge was thrown in with every Indictment. Since 1980, when I went
on the Federal Bench, I doubt that I have seen many Indictments that
did not contain a conspiracy charge. This is true even when the de-
fendant, or defendants, have been arrested after committing the
substantive crime. I suspect that the same is true throughout the
country.
39
Many of the federal courts, in particular, have seen the increase in conspiracy
charges. These courts may see yet another giant increase in the area if the President's
position on gun-related cases prevails. Recently the Bush Administration announced that
it would seek "to have as many criminal cases as possible prosecuted in Federal courts
rather than state courts when the cases involve guns .. "40 Because many of the gun
cases involve multiple defendants, we can expect that such a policy, code named "Project
Triggerlock" by former Attorney General Thornburgh, would result in many more
conspiracy charges in the federal courts.4'
B. Complexity of the Conspiracy Prosecutions
Perhaps the most striking change in the conspiracy area during the past two
decades has been the enormous number of cases involving many defendants, complex
evidentiary issues, and dozens and dozens of complicated charges. While it was not highly
unusual twenty years ago to see such big and cumbersome cases, today it is absolutely
commonplace. Consider, for instance, this handful of recent and somewhat typical cases:
* United States v. Casamento,42 with twenty-one defendants, 275 witnesses,
thousands of exhibits, and 40,000 pages of transcripts; the trial lasted
seventeen months.
* United States v. lanniello,43 lasted more than thirteen months at the trial
level; involved eleven defendants.
* United States v. Accetturo,44 twenty-six-defendant trial; lasted fifteen
months.
39 Letter from Alfredo C. Marquez, Judge, United States District Court, District of Arizona, to author
(Feb. 20, 1991) (on file with author).
40 Michael de Courey Hinds, Bush's Aides Push Gun-Related Cases on Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1991 at AI.
41 As the New York Times article points out, id., the increases in the federal courts have been truly
nothing short of the miracle referred to above. From 1980 to 1990 the number of federal prosecutors
doubled, to 3900 from 1900, and the number of drug cases increased five-fold, to 16,400 from 3,100. Id.
Drug cases represent about one-third of all federal criminal cases. id. Chief Judge Keep of the Federal
District for the Southern District of California, based in San Diego, stated in the article that "[plolicies like
Triggerlock will make a bad situation impossible." Id. at BI I. She noted that the district typically "tries
fewer than 50 of the 1,000 civil cases filed each year and spends more than 70 percent of its time on mostly
routine drug and gun cases." Id. Recognizing that the administration's proposal would "provide for Federal
jurisdiction over offenses traditionally reserved for state prosecution," Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his role as
presiding officer of the Judicial Conference of the United States, wrote House committee members urging a
rejection of this proposal. The Judicial Conference's statement noted that the "expansion of Federal
jurisdiction will swamp the Federal courts with routine cases that states are better equipped to handle." Ifill,
Chief Justice Urges House Panel to Reject Crime Bill Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1991, at A8.
42 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990).
43 866 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1989).
44 842 F.2d 1408 (3d Cir. 1988).
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* United States v. Kopituk,45 involved a seven-month trial with twelve
defendants, seventy counts, 130 witnesses, and more than 22,000 pages of
transcript.
* United States v. Martino,46 with twenty defendants and thirty-five counts;
produced a record of almost 100 volumes holding more than 11,000 pages
of the testimony of over 200 witnesses, along with five boxes of exhibits.
It is difficult to imagine how a jury goes about sorting the testimony of hundreds
of witnesses, or considering evidence it heard more than a year earlier. Indeed, how does
a jury begin to apply the reasonable doubt standard when there are more than fifty counts
charging more than a dozen different individuals? In today's world of conspiracy
prosecution, however, such a situation - while perhaps not the norm - occurs with great
frequency. And the impact on individual defendants can be quite severe. Defense counsel
Weiner makes the point well:
The smaller players in a large conspiracy trial will be denied a host of
other constitutional rights. They may well be denied bond due to the
magistrate being impressed by the evidence against more significant
conspirators; they will remain detained pretrial for a far longer period;
they will likely be denied a speedy trial due to protracted pretrial
proceedings, discovery, and motion practice related only to the more
significant players; they will be denied the testimony of co-defendants
whose testimony favorable to the lesser alleged conspirator is withheld
in the name of self-preservation; they will be denied a speedy appeal
and will have less chance to prevail on the merits due to the inertia of
the bound-together convictions. Aside from these devastating
consequences, as stated above, no matter what precautions a judge or
defense attorney takes, every defendant suffers tremendous prejudice as
a result of being associated at trial with other culpable defendants.47
Judge Mary Schroeder of the Ninth Circuit struck a similar chord when she wrote that:
"[t]here appears to be a legitimate concern on the part of defense lawyers that it is easy
to convict a defendant of a conspiracy by showing little more than guilt by association,
particularly in multi-defendant trials where those less culpable are joined with the ring
leader. 48
With such difficult problems presented by large multi-defendant cases, why then
do we see them with such regularity? The answer always has been that judicial economy
is served by trying many conspirators at the same time. The United States Supreme Court
dismissed the argument that separate trials would be a necessary or even desirable
practice:
Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice system, accounting
for almost one-third of federal criminal trials in the past five years....
Many joint trials - for example, those involving large conspiracies to
import and distribute illegal drugs - involve a dozen or more co-
defendants. Confessions by one or more of the defendants are
45 690 F.2d 1289 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209 (1983).
46 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
47 Letter from Weiner, supra note 28.
48 Letter from Mary M. Schroeder, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, to author
(Feb. 26, 1991) (on file with author).
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commonplace - and indeed the probability of confession increases with
the number of participants, since each has reduced assurance that he
will be protected by his own silence. It would impair both the efficiency
and the fairness of the criminal justice system to require, in all these
cases of joint crimes where incriminating statements exist, that
prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence
again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the
inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly
favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing
the prosecution's case beforehand. Joint trials generally serve the
interests of justice ... "
Still, the concerns about the impact of multi-defendant trials have been widely
expressed. Lest I be accused of overstating the problem, I should hasten to note that joint
trials involving complex matters are not a required procedure. Judges certainly have the
discretion to grant motions to split trials apart, as to both parties and charges. To be sure,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure - and most state rules as well - specifically
allow for such severance motions." The fact of the matter is, however, that it is unusual
for defense motions to be granted, even in these large complicated cases.
The starting point in terms of severance is the oft-cited proposition that in
"conspiracy cases, the general rule is that persons jointly indicted should be tried
together."'" The defense severance motion is granted only with a strong showing of
prejudice, and the denial of the motion for severance is reversed only for an abuse of
discretion. 2 The Eleventh Circuit recently made clear its reluctance to grant severance
motions:
[A] district judge is required to balance the prejudice that a defendant
may suffer from a joint trial, against the public's interest in judicial
economy and efficiency. In order to establish that a refusal to sever
constituted an abuse of discretion, an appellant must demonstrate that
he "suffered compelling prejudice against which the trial court was
unable to afford protection. 53
49 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1987).
50 FED. R. CRIM. P. 14, entitled "Relief from Prejudicial Joinder," provides in material part:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by
a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or infor-
mation or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order
an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of
defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
Id.
51 United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739, 751 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. and 112 S.Ct. 323
(1991) The court went on to write that this rule "is especially true where the offenses charged may be
established against all of the defendants by the same evidence resulting from the same series of acts."
Paulino, 935 F.2d at 751.
52 Id.
53 United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 1037 (1 1th Cir. 1991). This heavy burden on the defense
for severance is also found with different evidence being offered against the different parties (the so-called
"spillover impact"), and in situations in which co-defendants argue that, if they were tried separately, each
defendant would provide exculpatory testimony on the other's behalf. See generally Id. at 1037; United
States v. Emond, 935 F.2d 1511, 1514 (7th Cir. 1991).
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The severance motion generally is not granted even in the situations in which the
defendants directly attack one another. It is not enough, said the Sixth Circuit, that the
defendants' defenses are prejudicial to one another. Rather, the defenses must be so
antagonistic that they "will confuse or mislead the jury."54 The mere fact that each
defendant "points the finger" at his co-defendant is insufficient; a defendant seeking to
have a trial severed "must show that antagonistic defenses will confuse or mislead the
jury. ' 55
The one positive development in this difficult area has been the growing concerns
of trial judges both with their capability to manage such cases and with the ability of
juries to follow the evidence and satisfy their own obligations under the law. Thus, we
are just beginning to see trial judges thoughtfully and courageously move forward to break
up these large cases. The prototype for the future may be the actions taken by Judge
Marvin Aspen of the Northern District of Illinois in the widely-publicized case of United
States v. Andrews.5 6 The case involved a "labyrinthine 305-page, 175-count indictment
... nearly two inches thick and weighing almost four pounds... [which named] thirty-
eight defendants . . . [as alleged] members or associates of the El Rukns, an infamous
Chicago street gang."" The charges alleged more than 250 separate criminal acts from
1966 to 1989. The government asked for a single trial of all the parties and counts
because each of the criminal acts "was allegedly committed to attain power, control and
wealth for the street gang."58
Judge Aspen was faced with a serious dilemma. On the one hand, he found that
the parties and the counts had been properly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 8(b) because the defendants were "'alleged to have participated in the... same
series of acts' . . . [and because] all members of [a charged] conspiracy are properly
joined. '59 Joinder was proper because the defendants were alleged to have been part of
a single and unifying conspiracy. 6° On the other hand, Judge Aspen was convinced that
serious problems existed for this trial, and one would have to "weigh the public interest
in a joint trial of the twenty-two to twenty-nine defendants against the possibility of undue
prejudice or confusion arising from such a trial."61
The court in Andrews concluded that severance was essential:
62
Thus, it is clear that a "monster" trial such as the one proposed here
presents uniquely significant inefficiencies and hardships. These
disadvantages far outweigh any arguable advantages of a joint trial,
including the potential reduction in aggregate trial time, which in this
54 United States v. Crotinger, 928 F.2d 203, 206 (6th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Caporale,
806 F.2d 1487, 1510 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987) (severance only required if "the
jury will infer that both defendants are guilty solely because of the conflict" between their defenses). The
court in Emond stated the matter directly: "Because of the 'strong public interest in having persons jointly
indicted tried together,'. . . 'hostility and finger pointing during the joint trial ... alone [are] insufficient to
justify granting a severance."' Emond, 935 F.2d at 1514.
55 Crotinger, 928 F.2d at 206.
56 754 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. I11. 1990).
57 Id. at 1164. In addition to the "standard" conspiracy charge, one of the counts charged 36
defendants with substantive violations of RICO and listed 128 separate acts of racketeering. Id. at 1165.
58 Id. at 1164.
59 Id. at 1168 (citations omitted).
60 Id. at 1169, being unified under the RICO charge.
61 Id. at 1170.
62 For additional discussion of Judge Aspen's actions see infra text accompanying notes 226-27.
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case in any event is doubtful. Accordingly, a strong presumption in
favor of a joint trial is not justified in the context of a mega-trial.
Indeed, since several separate and shorter trials involving smaller groups
of defendants would largely eliminate the disadvantages of such a trial,
the public interest supports a strong presumption against a joint mega-
trial and in favor of severance.63
Noting that the problems in this case were not atypical,6 the judge developed a
severance plan for splitting this huge case into five separate, sequenced trials. 65 Such an
effort by the trial judge involved meticulous review of the documentation in the case, a
willingness to confront strong prosecutorial objections, and an ability to devise a
thoughtful and practical solution. Judge Aspen's plan appears to be a well-considered
approach which will promote the interests of justice.
C. RICO Emerges
In 1970 Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act, containing Title IX,
"Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," commonly known as RICO.'M The
intent of Congress was "to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault
upon organized crime and its economic roots."67 In the early years after its passage,
RICO proved to be of limited use in the federal courts, and in the state courts as well.68
Over the past decade, the RICO debate has become intense and has merged with the
63 Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1175 (citations omitted).
64 Unfortunately, prosecutors long have been willing to bring cases of this nature, despite
the violence they do to the notion of a fair trial. Indeed, prosecutors generally have
demonstrated an increasing "penchant for drawing together evermore complex and
extensive conspiracies into a single indictment." This phenomenon can be explained
by the fact that prosecutors have significant incentives to bring mass indictments, not
the least of which is the consequent ability to procure a large number of convictions in
what they perceive to be the shortest amount of time. The regrettable truth, however,
is that these incentives carry far greater weight in the charging decision than any
concern for a fair and manageable trial. It seems unlikely, then, that the recent
increase in mega-trials will soon be curbed at the initiations of the prosecutions.
Id. at 1180 (citations and footnotes omitted). As of this writing, the severance plan does not appear to have
harmed the government. It has received 33 convictions in the first three trials. See Businessman, 6 Others
Guilty in Chicago Street Gang Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1991, at A4.
65 Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1181-82, modified, id. at 1197 and at 1206. Mention should also be
made of the important Second Circuit case, United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1152 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990) which adopted a presumption against joint trials when faced with a
request for a "mega-trial." The court in that case noted that, if the government estimated that a trial would
run more than four months, it should "present a reasoned basis to support a conclusion that a joint trial of all
the defendants is more consistent with the fair administration of justice than some manageable division of
the case into separate trials for groups of defendants." And if the case involved more than ten defendants,
"the prosecutor [should] make an especially compelling justification for a joint trial." See generally Robert
0. Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1979).
66 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.
67 Adams v. United States, 474 U.S. 971, 973 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983)).
68 Soon after the federal law was passed, many state legislatures passed their own versions based
almost entirely on the federal model. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 8b: §§ 18-17-101 to -09 (1986); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-6-1 to -2 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-1.1 to -6.2, 5:12-125 to -29 (West
1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-1 to -II (1986).
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controversy surrounding conspiracy law.69 Before turning to that debate, however, it is
important to have a clear understanding of what RICO is and what it can do.
RICO actually does not create any new substantive offense, except to the extent
that it ties together existing crimes in an enterprise liability charge.7° The substantive
provisions of RICO make it a crime to conduct a pattern of racketeering activity through
involvement in an enterprise.7' The statute also makes it criminal to conspire to violate
the substantive provisions.72 The argument about RICO has centered on three aspects of
the crime:7 3 defining the pattern, limiting the scope of the enterprise, and applying the
conspiracy crime to the enterprise.74 The courts have given RICO a broad reading. The
Supreme Court in a series of cases has allowed RICO prosecutions to proceed with
widely-defined "patterns," has applied the enterprise doctrine to both lawful and unlawful
associations, and has allowed the RICO forfeiture provisions to be used liberally.
7 5
RICO, combined with conspiracy, has always had the potential to cause serious
definition and application problems, especially with large multi-defendant prosecutions.
After all, it is hard to imagine two terms more difficult to confine in such cases than
"enterprise" and "agreement." Still, the problems with such issues have been seen rather
unevenly throughout the country. In some places RICO has had fairly limited impact.
Judge Richard Mills of the United States District Court in Springfield, Illinois has reported
that he has "had no significant criminal RICO cases."76 This view has been repeated by
the Honorable Thomas Flannery of the District Court for the District of Columbia ("I
can't recall having tried a criminal RICO case. ... ),77 Judge Bilby of Arizona ("Not
69 For good discussions, see Barry Tarlow, RICO: The Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49
FORDHAM L. REVIEW. 165 (1980); Project, White-Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 173, 351-70 (1981).
70 "RICO does not create a new type of substantive crime since any acts which are punishable under
RICO also are punishable under existing federal and state statutes." Jeff Atkinson, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. LAW
& CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1978).
71 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
72 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
73 These questions are wholly apart from the civil RICO issues where most of the recent controversy
has actually been focused. For a good overview of the problem in the civil area, see RICO and its Progeny:
Good or Bad Law?, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 369 (1986) (transcript of debate between
Judge Abner Mikva and Professor G. Robert Blakely).
74 The problems with the substantive RICO crime continue. See, e.g., United States v. Coonan, 938
F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct
595 (1991); United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940
(10th Cir. 1991). The language of the court in Lange v. Hocker, 940 F.2d 359, 360 (8th Cir. 1991) shows
the increasing judicial frustration with RICO:
We are confronted with yet another RICO case asking us to divine what constitutes a
pattem of racketeering activity. The efflorescence of RICO's judicial interpretation has
not been an uncomplicated progression; indeed, the flowering of the statute's legacy is
akin to jungle underbrush run amok. With machete in hand, we attempt to clear a path
to reach the case now before us. Having hacked our way through the tangle, we
affirm....
Id.
75 The most prominent RICO cases from the Supreme Court are: H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
76 Letter from Richard Mills, Judge, United States District Court, Central District of Illinois, to author
(Jan. 29, 1991) (on file with author).
77 Letter from Thomas A. Flannery, Judge, United States District Court, District of District of
Columbia, to author (May 28, 1991) (on file with author).
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enough of these cases have been filed in Tucson to make any kind of an estimate."), 78
Judge Green of the Illinois Appellate Court ("RICO has not been used very often in cases
which reach our court. Our Clerk indicated to me that he could remember only two such
cases that we have had. My memory is consistent with this."), 79 and Judge Schroeder of
the Ninth Circuit ("RICO was very popular for awhile, but seems to have faded
somewhat. Perhaps this is because we are still not sure what all the words mean.").8 0 In
his letter, United States District Judge William Terrell Hodges discussed the RICO
question:
My experience has been that RICO counts have not supplanted
conspiracy charges; rather, when reasonably available, a RICO count
has been added in tandem with a conspiracy charge, under § 1962(d),
and the predicate substantive offenses. My impression is that
prosecutors are prone to add RICO charges not for the same reasons
that prompt the adding of a conspiracy count, but for the reason that
RICO is a much more serious charge (20 years imprisonment) .... See
also Section 2E1.l, U.S.S.G. The seriousness of the charge, of course,
relates directly to the leverage of the prosecution in plea negotiations
especially in white collar offenses.8
In other parts of the country, however, RICO has been charged regularly and
often combined with the conspiracy offense. Chief Judge Bauer of the Seventh Circuit was
quite blunt about the rise of RICO:
The impact of RICO has been enormous - on the civil cases as well.
Just on the criminal side, the forfeiture provisions are so tempting damn
near every case with more than one defendant is strained into RICO.
RICO accounts for most of the increase in conspiracy prosecutions;
again, the drug area is the prime target.
82
When RICO is combined with criminal conspiracy, it can create enormous
problems. The best such example may be the El Rukn gang case from Chicago, discussed
above, United States v. Andrews. 3 The indictment in that case charged the defendants
with conspiracy to violate RICO, asserting that the El Rukn organization was a
racketeering enterprise within the meaning of the statute. 4 The defendants argued that
the facts would show that there were truly separate groupings of defendants such that
there were a number of conspiracies, not a single overarching pact. The court agreed with
the defendants' view but noted the impact of RICO:
With the advent of RICO, Congress significantly broadened the scope
of the government's authority to bring defendants together in one
indictment. It conferred this broad authority without. "radically
78 Letter from Bilby, supra note 38.
79 Letter from Green, supra note 36.
80 Letter from Schroeder, supra note 48.
81 Letter from Hodges, supra note 35.
82 Letter from Bauer, supra note 33.
83 754 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. 11. 1990).
84 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
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alter[ing] traditional conspiracy doctrine .. " Instead, Congress simply
outlawed a particular conspiratorial agreement, the object of which
could include the commission of a wide array of separate and distinct
offenses. Section 1962(d) of the RICO statute proscribes agreements "to
conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity.'""
The court concluded that joinder of all the defendants was proper because they were
charged as members of "a single'and unifying RICO conspiracy."86
A case like Andrews demonstrates the broad potential that is available to
prosecutors in linking conspiracy with RICO as the charge becomes agreeing to engage
in an enterprise, surely one of the least definable concepts in our criminal justice
system. 7 Moreover, to prove the RICO conspiracy the government generally does not
have to show that the defendant herself committed the racketeering acts or even that she
personally agreed to commit those acts. It is sufficient to show her agreement to the
objective of a violation of RICO." Professor Johnson noted the problem when he wrote
to me that "[a]ll of the opportunities for abuse and excess have been magnified in RICO,
as the courts have construed that misleading statute .... Broad and vaguely defined
offenses, combined with horrendous sentencing possibilities, give the prosecution the
power to make an offer which the defense cannot refuse." 9
85 Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1168.
86 Id. at 1169 (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 747 (E.D.N.Y.
1987): "If we were to apply pre-RICO concepts of conspiracy to this case, we would likely find that a single
conspiracy could not be charged based on these allegations.... The limitations on the prosecution's power
to charge are virtually eviscerated by the RICO conspiracy device." Id.
87 The most influential RICO conspiracy case in the "early" years is United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d
880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). In that case six defendants and more than three dozen
unindicted co-conspirators constituted what was described as "a myriopod criminal network, loosely
connected but connected nonetheless." Elliott, 571 F.2d at 899. They were alleged to have stolen goods,
distributed narcotics, and committed arson. The ultimate proof as to their combined activity was not strong:
The activities allegedly embraced by the illegal agreement in this case are simply too
diverse to be tied together on the theory that participation in one activity necessarily
implied awareness of others .... The enterprise involved in this case probably could
not have been successfully prosecuted as a single conspiracy under the general federal
conspiracy statute....
Id. at 902. The court found, however, that RICO could "come to the rescue" because of the enterprise and
pattern of activity structure: "To be convicted as a member of an enterprise conspiracy, an individual, by his
words or actions, must have objectively manifested an agreement to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
affairs of an enterprise through the commission of two or more predicate crimes." Id. at 903 (emphasis in
original).
88 Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1169. The RICO debate in recent years has been furious. For some
thoughtful treatments, see Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661
(1987); Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774 (1988); Barry
Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291 (1983); United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986). For an excellent discussion of the problems in this area, see
Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1161.
89 Professor Johnson went on to write that "[a]ll this has accomplished much positive good in the
form of successful prosecutions of white collar and organized criminals, but I fear we have created a monster
and will live to regret it." Letter from Johnson, supra note 18. See also the rather cryptic remark by Judge
Mikva that he "think[s] the existence of a RICO threat has substantially affected the way that criminal
charges are drawn, bargained over and tried." Letter from Abner J. Mikva, Chief Judge, United States
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, to author (Feb. 8, 1991) (on file with author).
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Attorney Jeffrey Weiner condemned the use of RICO but offered a possible
positive result of its use:
I think the impact of RICO in the area has been two-fold. First, it has
provided prosecutors with another tool that is easily abused and places
criminally accused at a severe disadvantage. As with conspiracy statutes,
RICO statutes permit the government to join together smaller,
manageable (from the defense perspective) prosecutions into multi-
defendant mega cases that place defendants at the same disadvantage as
conspiracy prosecutions. I have seen cases where garden variety
misdemeanor charges have been parlayed into major RICO prosecutions
carrying far more substantial (and unwarranted) penalties and requiring
a much more aggressive and sophisticated defense. On the other hand,
because RICO charges are far more complex than many other charges
covering similar offenses, they provide the opportunity to develop more
creative, technical and legal defenses. The unfairness of prosecuting and
trying a small player in a major RICO trial is more obvious than the
same unfairness inherent in trying these defendants in large conspiracy
trials. However, once a judge has recognized the former situation, she
is much more likely to be sensitive to the latter situation. Thus, the
government's flagrant abuse of RICO prosecutions may ultimately lead
to more judicially imposed fairness in more common conspiracy
prosecutions.9"
Looking at the criminal RICO cases certainly will give one considerable pause.
Still, the problems with the civil RICO cases seem to have engendered far more concern
and criticism.9 Moreover, it is also true that the criminal RICO cases are prosecuted
quite unevenly throughout the country. Some districts hardly ever seem to see the crime
while in others the problems are real and intense. A comment by Judge Goodwin of the
Ninth Circuit reflects this point: "My intuition is that criminal RICO was a lot of sound
and fury about not much substance. It made Congress feel good to think that it had done
something about organized crime."92
D. Proving a True Agreement
One feature of criminal conspiracy law has remained a constant over the past
twenty years: a concern that individuals who are not actually members of the group will
be swept into the conspiratorial net.93 This feature manifests itself in three important
ways.
90 Letter from Weiner, supra note 28.
91 Certainly most of the discussion concerning reform of the RICO law has focused not on the
criminal application, but instead on the civil and forfeiture provisions. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, House
Panel Backs Easing of Civil Racketeering Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at D8. In the article it is noted
that "about 1,000 civil racketeering cases have been filed each year since 1985, up from a total of 270 cases
from 1970 to 1985, according to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts." See generally
Rhonda McMillion, ABA Seeks End of Civil RICO Abuses, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 112.
92 Letter from Goodwin, supra note 20.
93 Long ago Clarence Darrow remarked, "If there are still any citizens interested in protecting human
liberty, let them study the conspiracy laws of the United States." See CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF
MY LIFE 64 (1932).
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1. Guilt by Association
Because conspiracy by its very nature is difficult to prove, the government is
given broad discretion' in offering its case. The agreement may be shown by wholly
circumstantial evidence, 94 and the individual's intent to join the agreement can be
demonstrated by "[c]ircumstances altogether inconclusive . . . [which] may, by their
number and joint operation ... be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof."95 Moreover,
individuals can be found guilty of the crime if shown to have conspired with unknown
conspirators.96 Such leeway is deemed to be necessary to combat large criminal projects,
because "a conspiracy is seldom born of 'open covenants openly arrived at."' 97
Allowing such broad prosecutorial discretion gives rise to the fear that those who
associate with conspirators, those who know about the conspiracy, may themselves be
convicted of a crime which they have not intended to commit, and may be found to be
a part of a group which they never joined.98 The problem, of course, is accentuated in
large, multi-defendant conspiracy trials where it may be difficult to keep matters straight
over a six- or ten-month period.99 This concern was expressed to me by defense lawyers,
judges and prosecutors. Federal Judge Bilby from Arizona stated that the major
disadvantage for defendants in facing a conspiracy count was "primarily pulling in
marginally connected people and then convicting them of the conspiracy and substantive
counts - very unfair."' A more positive development is a widely-held belief that
many courts are beginning to recognize this problem to a far greater extent than ever
before. Jeffrey Weiner from Miami, a harsh critic of many of the conspiracy rules, wrote
that he has "observed a growing sensitivity in some of the federal appellate courts to the
notion that innocent persons who are merely present or in association with others at the
time of drug raids do get swept up in the dragnet of conspiracy investigations and are
improperly prosecuted (and convicted) .... [These] courts have reversed several
conspiracy convictions, . . . where, though the evidence may have aroused substantial
94 United States v. Juarez-Fierro, 935 F.2d 672, 677 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Adamo, 882
F.2d 1218, 1223 (7th Cit. 1989); United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 966 (1988).
95 United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2264 (1990).
96 See United States v. Valles-Valencia, 811 F.2d 1232, 1239 (9th Cir. 1987).
97 United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1011 (5th Cir.) (quoting Lacaze v. United States, 391 F.2d
516 (5th Cir. 1968)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976).
98 This fear becomes intensified when the prosecution occurs in courts which accept the so-called
"slight evidence rule." When a conspiracy is shown, "even a slight connection to the defendant will sustain
his conviction." United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Candoli, 870
F.2d 496, 511 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Copple, 827 F.2d 1182, 1187 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1073 (1988); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1275 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1117 (1983). This is a highly questionable proposition because it is not clear whether the courts mean
to suggest that jurors can be instructed on anything other than the reasonable doubt standard for individual
defendants (clearly they cannot be) or whether somehow the government is relieved of its burden to show
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Several cases, recognizing the difficulty with this statement of law, have
rejected this "rule". The most prominent to "banish" it are United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1225
(7th Cir. 1990) (substantial evidence needed to show the conspiracy and the 'defendant's involvement in it);
and United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 and 444 U.S. 846
(1979).
99 Two works in this area may be of particular use: Federal Bar Council Committee on Second
Circuit Courts, A Proposal Concerning Problems Created by Extremely Long Criminal Trials (1989) and
ABA Report, Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases (Dec. 1989). Both of these documents are discussed in
United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161, 1161 (N.D. 111. 1990).
100 Letter from Bilby, supra, note 38.
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suspicion concerning the defendant, it failed to establish more than association and
presence."'o'
A look at some of the cases Weiner cites is instructive in terms of seeing the
closer scrutiny that judges appear to be giving to the notion of guilt by association. In
United States v. Villegas,'0 2 the evidence clearly showed that one brother had engaged
in narcotics trafficking. Against the other brother, however, the evidence was not so clear.
He was seen by the officers outside the house of his brother, he looked up and down the
street when he exited the house, and he followed his brother to a parking lot where the
subject drug transaction took place. The court on appeal reversed the conspiracy
conviction, finding that it "hinges on [his] relationship with his brother.... Knowing
participation in a conspiracy, however, cannot be proved solely by a family relationship
or other types of close association."'0 3
A similar treatment of the difficult issues took place in United States v.
Hernandez.04 There the government's case principally was that the defendant drove
in the drug dealer's car and was present at the time of the drug delivery. These facts, even
coupled with the defendant's flight from the scene (after he had "picked up on
something"), were insufficient from the appellate court's view. The court recognized that
the government did not have to prove its case by direct evidence and that presence at the
scene of the crime "'is a material and probative factor which the jury may consider in
reaching its decision."' 10 5 While the court agreed that the defendant's behavior was
suspicious, the burden was on the government to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant knew of the conspiracy and voluntarily joined it.'1 6 This the government
had not done "[c]onspiratorial intent cannot exist without knowledge; evidence of
knowledge must be clear and unequivocal.'' 07
101 Letter from Weiner, supra note 28.
102 911 F.2d 623 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 1625 (1991).
103 Villegas, 911 F.2d at 630. The court discussed the matter further:
Deciding what is or is not sufficient evidence is always a difficult chore and it
becomes even more so when the factual backdrop consists of a reprehensible traffic in
pernicious narcotics. But the presumption of innocence remains constant, irrespective
of the heinous nature of condemned activity, as does the requirement that the govern-
ment prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the presence of mere
suspicion and speculation.
Id. at 630. But see the opinion of Judge Roney, dissenting in part:
We have had enough of these cases to know that drug dealers use look-outs. The jury
knew this. Assuming Jairo to be a look-out, it is not clear what he would have done
that he did not do, or what more evidence one might expect. This Circuit has long
ago rejected the mere presence defense when the evidence would indicate that drug
dealers would not have tolerated the defendant being present were he not involved.
Id. at 633 (Roney, J., dissenting in part).
104 896 F.2d 513 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 159 (1990).
105 Hernandez, 896 F.2d at 518 (quoting United States v. Kincade, 714 F.2d 1064, 1065 (1 1th Cir.
1983)).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 519. See also United States v. Hill, 936 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1991), motion for
modification of opinion filed: "The essential elements of conspiracy are an agreement to accomplish an
illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose, and the requisite
intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense." Id.
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2. The Unilateral Approach
The traditional view of conspiracy law has always been that the added group
danger justifying this crime was based upon an agreement linking two or more willing
criminal partners together. In many situations, however, only one party may be a willing
participant while the other is simply one who feigns agreement. The situation occurs most
often, as might be expected, with the undercover police agent who is involved in some
sort of sting arrangement. 0 8 In such a situation, the question arises as to whether the
"true" conspirator should be responsible under the conspiracy offense.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code long ago took the position that no actual
agreement was needed, and that a unilateral approach to conspiracy should be pursued.
The argument follows the notion that the danger issue should focus on the individual's
culpable state of mind, not on the presence of a bilateral agreement:
He has conspired, within the meaning of the definition, in the belief that
the other party was with him; apart from the issue of entrapment often
presented in such cases, his culpability is not decreased by the other's
secret intention. True enough, the project's chances of success have not
been increased by the agreement; indeed, its doom may have been
sealed by this turn of events. But the major basis of conspiratorial
liability - the unequivocal evidence of a firm purpose to commit a
crime - remains the same."0
Many have objected to a unilateral approach to conspiracy, claiming that it
destroyed the fundamental basis for the crime, an agreement of multiple parties."0 Still,
the Model Penal Code position held sway with many state legislators, and many of the
new criminal codes adopted the unilateral approach."' Fifteen years ago, I asked judges
and practicing lawyers whether the unilateral approach would have much impact in the
criminal justice system. Overwhelmingly, the answer was that the approach would be of
108 However, this is not always the case, as seen in State v. St. Christopher, 232 N.W.2d 798 (Minn.
1975). In St. Christopher the defendant tried to entice his cousin to join in the murder of his mother. Id. at
799. The cousin pretended to agree but then worked with the police in gathering evidence against the
defendant. Id. The court affirmed the defendant's conspiracy conviction because the state law, following
the Model Penal Code, spoke only to the culpability of the defendant, not the agreement between two or
more parties. Id. at 803.
109 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 105 (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1960).
110 The unilateral approach makes sense at first blush. The unsuccessful conspirator did
try to conspire - his state of mind was clearly criminal - but did he enter into a
conspiracy? The conspiracy charge may subject the defendant to criminal liability at
an earlier stage than any other inchoate offense and may raise procedural problems at
trial. The stated reason for such results is the special danger resulting from group
planning.... The Supreme Court has stated that "tilt is impossible in the nature of
things for a man to conspire with himself. In California as elsewhere conspiracy
imports a corrupt agreement between not less than two with guilty knowledge on the
part of each."
Marcus, Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 959-60. See generally Dierdre A. Burgman, Unilateral Conspiracy:
Three Critical Perspectives, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 75 (1979); Comment, Conspirators May Go It Alone These
Days, 12 MIL. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 549 (1989).
III After speaking with various legislative groups, I have concluded that the legislators presumably
were persuaded that the question here should focus on personal culpability and individual danger rather than
the concept of group activity.
19921
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
minimal significance." 2 At the time, I was skeptical, believing that the use of the
unilateral approach could be very important, particularly in drug cases. I was wrong.
While there have certainly been convictions based upon the unilateral
approach," 3 relatively few cases go forward where a substantive offense has not been
committed (or attempted), or where there have not been multiple parties jointly dealing
with the undercover officer. Moreover, some state courts in facing a genuine unilateral
approach situation have refused to recognize it as the law of the state. The most prominent
case relying on the bilateral approach is People v. Foster." 4 There the Illinois Supreme
Court acknowledged that the state legislature indeed had adopted the unilateral approach
of the Model Penal Code.' The court refused to believe that the legislature understood
what it was doing when it had accepted this approach:
The committee comments to section 8-2 detail the several changes in
the law of conspiracy that were intended by the 1961 amendment. The
comments simply do not address the unilateral/bilateral issue. The State
suggests that the new language was so clear on its face that it did not
warrant additional discussion. We doubt, however, that the drafters
could have intended what represents a rather profound change in the law
of conspiracy without mentioning it in the comments to section 8-2.ll6
The court noted that the state solicitation statute "embraces virtually every situation in
which one could be convicted of conspiracy under the unilateral theory.'" 1 Hence, the
court was not overly concerned about eliminating that which the legislative body had
seemingly passed."' Whether or not this view accurately reflects legislative intent, I
believe that it squarely supports the correct rationale for the conspiracy offense.'
112 Marcus, Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 960-61.
"13 See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 779 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. 1989); State v. Gaydas, 766 P.2d 629 (Ariz.
1988); Guinn v. State, 740 S.W.2d 148 (Ark. 1987); Minniefield v. State, 512 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. 1987).
114 457 N.E.2d 405 (Ill. 1983).
115 The Illinois statute referred only to the person who agrees with another; it deleted the traditional
words "two or more persons who agree." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 para. 8-2 (Smith-Hurd 1989).
116 Foster, 457 N.E.2d at 407 (citation omitted).
117 Id. at 408.
118 The Illinois court does not stand alone in rejecting the unilateral approach, even in states in which
legislatures seemingly have adopted it. See also Commonwealth v. Campbell, 390 A.2d 761, 764, affd, 399
A.2d 130 (Pa. 1978).
119 The Ninth Circuit stated the position very well:
The rationale behind making conspiracy a crime also supports [the bilateral] rule.
Criminal conspiracy is an offense separate from the actual criminal act because of the
perception "that collective action toward an antisocial end involves a greater risk to
society than individual action toward the same end." In part, this view is based on the
perception that group activity increases the likelihood of success of the criminal act
and of future criminal activity by members of the group, and is difficult for law
enforcement officers to detect .... Such dangers, however, are non-existent when a
person "conspires" only with a government agent.
United States v. DeBright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Developments in the Law -
Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 923-24 (1959)).
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3. Consistency
The unilateral approach, I concede, well may have engendered more expressions
of anguish and concern than now appear justified. In those jurisdictions embracing the
bilateral approach to conspiracy, however, an analogous and more serious change has
taken place over the past decade. For a long time the Rule of Consistency stood as a
major obstacle to those who would lessen the requirement of a true multiparty agreement
and instead emphasize individual culpability. Under this Rule, a conviction of one charged
conspirator could not stand where the only other charged conspirator was acquitted of
conspiracy. The Rule adopts the fundamental view that "at least two persons are required
to constitute a conspiracy." 2 °
The Rule has its critics, those who believe that it overemphasizes joint criminality
and underemphasizes proof of individual intent.'21 The Rule also has a considerable
number of exceptions and limitations. The co-conspirator must actually be acquitted, a
hung jury is not enough,'22 nor will a plea suffice.2 3 The acquittal must occur at the
joint trial with the remaining conspirator, 24 and the Rule does not apply if an agreement
is actually shown, even if the other conspirators are not named in the indictment. 25
Even with these substantial limitations, the Rule has stood as a strong affirmation of the
group danger base for the crime of conspiracy.
26
Two Supreme Court decisions cast doubts on the continued viability of the Rule,
in the minds of a number of judges. In Standefer v. United States,127 the Court held that
a person could be convicted of aiding a principal, even though the principal had been
acquitted of the substantive offense. 28 The Court in United States v. Powell129 went
further when it held that a jury could reach inconsistent verdicts as to a single defendant
120 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951).
121 Note, The Unnecessary Rule of Consistency in Conspiracy Trials, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 223 (1986).
122 United States v. Dakins, 872 F.2d 1061, 1065 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966 (1989).
123 State v. Morris, 666 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1983).
124 United States v. Walker, 871 F.2d 1298, 1304 n.5 (6th Cir. 1989).
125 This situation normally occurs when the government charges that the defendant was involved with
other persons not then known to the grand jury. See, e.g., United States v. Piccolo, 723 F.2d 1234, 1239
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1983).
126 The court in State v. Robinson, 567 A.2d 1173, 1178 (Conn. 1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original) applied the rule in a case in which the co-conspirator had been acquitted in a prior trial. The
language of the court is very broad:
It is our view ... that the crime of conspiracy is unique in our criminal justice system
in that it is directed at group culpability rather than at individual culpability. It is this
qualitative difference from other crimes that prevents us from embracing the view
urged by the state .... "'The gravamen of the crime of conspiracy is the unlawful
combination and act done in pursuance thereof, not the accomplishment of the
objective of the conspiracy.' . . . '. . . The prohibition of conspiracy is directed not at
the unlawful object, but at the process of agreeing to pursue that object.' Because the
essence of conspiracy is the mental confederation of two or more persons, the crime is
in every sense indivisible."
Id.
127 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
128 The principal in the case was actually acquitted at a separate, earlier trial. Id. at 12-13. Moreover,
the jury in the later case was instructed that it could not find for the government unless it concluded, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the principal had committed the offense and that the defendant had aided in its
commission. Id. at 13 n.6.
129 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
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in a trial. 30 These cases, it is argued, demonstrate that the Rule of Consistency would
no longer be embraced by the Supreme Court. The leading opinion is United States v.
Bucuvalas, 3' where the court wrote that "the acquittal of all conspirators but one does
not . . . necessarily indicate that the jury found no agreement to act.'' 132 The court
concluded that the Supreme Court's decisions now hold "that inconsistent verdicts,
whether the result of leniency, compromise, or mistake, 'should not be reviewable.""
13
I do not share the broad reading given to the Supreme Court's two decisions, nor
do I view them as necessarily applicable to the conspiracy charge. On the former point,
I note that Standefer involved separate trials for the parties, a situation which itself is
excluded from the consistency principle. Moreover, Powell involved a very different fact
pattern with multiple charges against a single person. On the latter point, the forceful
dissent of Judge Clark in United States v. Andrews134 is persuasive. He looked to the
unique aspects of the crime of conspiracy and the violence this broad treatment does to
the concept. Quoting an earlier court decision, he wrote:
A conspiracy cannot be committed by a single individual acting alone;
he must act in concert with at least one other person. The acquittal of
one conspirator would thus be immaterial where there are several other
named conspirators, or other conspirators charged but unknown to the
jury. But where all but one of the charged conspirators are acquitted,
the verdict against the one will not stand.
35
130 The defendant in Powell was convicted of facilitating felonies but was acquitted of the same
underlying offenses. Though finding that the verdicts were inconsistent, the Supreme Court allowed the
convictions because "[one cannot] necessarily assume[] that the acquittal ... was proper - the one the jury
'really meant.'' Id. at 68.
131 909 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1990).
132 Id. at 596.
133 Id. at 597. The court in United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1091 n.13 (3d Cir. 1989)
(citation omitted), further explained the rationale behind the Supreme Court's decisions:
Significantly, in both Standefer and Powell the Supreme Court relied on the fact that in
reality, inconsistent jury verdicts are often a product of jury lenity. Thus, the Court
recognized that the jury has an "historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against
arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive Branch." An acquittal on
one count, the Court therefore reasoned, does not necessarily indicate that the jury did
not find there to be sufficient evidence of guilt on that charge. Thus, the acquittal
should not mandate reversal of a finding of guilt on another charge which is dependent
on the same factual allegations.
Id.
134 850 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1032 (1988).
135 Andrews, 850 F.2d at 1571 (quoting Herman v. United States, 289 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 897 (1961)). He went on to write:
[A]llowing inconsistent verdicts in conspiracy cases presents an unparalleled opportu-
nity for the jury blatantly to treat equal participants unequally .... Conspiracy is
already defined by a single element - an agreement to do something illegal - that is
virtually always proven entirely by circumstantial evidence. Surely some limits are
necessary to keep it from becoming any more nebulous .... [A] defendant cannot be
convicted of conspiracy if the same jury has acquitted all of the defendant's alleged
co-conspirators. I would do so not in an effort to speculate on what the jury's verdict
meant, but in the interests of equal justice under the law and reserving the law of
conspiracy for those situations where there truly has been group action.
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It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court meant to say that a jury could convict
one of only two alleged conspirators while finding the other charged individual not guilty.
Could the Court genuinely have meant that it was willing to discard the fundamental basis
for the crime of conspiracy, a basis which it has repeatedly cited over the past seventy
years? 136 Whatever else may be found in these cases, surely it is not a conspiracy which
looks to the notions of group danger, multiple parties, and joint endeavors. Only the future
will tell whose reading of the Court's opinions is correct and whether we shall see a
renewed attack on the bilateral requirement for the conspiracy offense.
4. The Evidentiary Advantages
Many advantages for the government are associated with the conspiracy
charge.'37 Venue is proper in any jurisdiction in which an overt act, any overt act, took
place;' 38 joinder is proper of many parties committing many crimes over a long period
of time; 39 and - as we shall see - a single conspiracy can in certain circumstances
be divided up to produce multiple terms of imprisonment for the single agreement. 4 °
Certainly, these advantages are important and in some cases are crucial to the ultimate
determinations of guilt or innocence, and sentence, for particular individuals. Nevertheless,
the chief evidentiary advantage remains what it has always been, the rule regarding
declarations by co-conspirators. In 1977, lawyers and judges referred to this as the
principal advantage for the crime. This table, earlier published, chronicles the response
to the question of doing away with the co-conspirator declaration rule:
Question 10. What would be the result of eliminating the hearsay exception in
cases where conspiracy is charged or where it is the uncharged basis for the
charged crime?
136 It has repeated this basis, and so has virtually every other American court. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Hunter, 360 A.2d 702, 706 (Pa. 1976) (quoting Commonwealth v. Salerno, 116 A.2d 87, 89 (Pa.
1955)) (citations omitted):
in a charge for conspiracy the Commonwealth must prove that two or more are guilty.
Where, therefore, there are only two conspirators and one is acquitted, the other
cannot, of course, be tried or convicted.... Where one of the two conspirators is
acquitted, then there is a legal determination that one is innocent and thus there cannot
be two guilty conspirators.
Id.
137 In responding to a question about the advantages of a conspiracy charge, United States District
Judge Hodges of Tampa wrote, "I assume this means advantages to the prosecution since I can't think of any
Iadvantages' offered to the defendant(s) or the judge." Letter from Hodges, supra note 35. See also the
comment made by United States District Judge Thomas Flannery of the District of Columbia: "The
advantages in conspiracy charges seem to be all in favor of the prosecutor .... I can think of no real
disadvantage for the prosecutor who brings a conspiracy prosecution, assuming he has the necessary
evidence for a successful prosecution. The disadvantages are all with the defendant." Letter from Flannery,
supra note 77.
138 Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
139 See supra text accompanying notes 42-49.
140 See infra text accompanying notes 199-211.
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Significant
reduction Small reduction
in convictions in convictions No effect
Prosecutors 61.7 24.4 14.0
Defense attorneys 72.1 22.7 5.2
Appellate judges 56.5 32.6 10.9
Trial judges 42.4 49.2 8.5
Law professors 51.8 42.9 5.4
Average for all 62.6 27.8 9.6
respondents'
41
The rule, in substance, has remained constant during the last fifty years or so.
The basis for this special hearsay rule 42 is not rooted in traditional notions of
evidentiary reliability, but rather in the belief that the parties act as agents of one another
and, therefore, should be held responsible for the statements of one another. The statement
of one conspirator will be substantive evidence against the others if "there is substantial,
independent evidence of the existence of the conspiracy ...; that the defendant and
declarant were both members of the conspiracy; and the statements were made in the
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy."'' 43 This statement of the law has
changed little, and so has the view that the rule remains of great significance. Former
Assistant United States Attorney David Nimmer of Los Angeles wrote that "the lingering
thought that remains with me is that just about the most significant feature of conspiracy
is the hearsay exception . '. ." Federal District Judge Hodges of Florida indicated that
the proliferation of conspiracy counts has been encouraged by the "simplification and
clarification of both the substantive and procedural jurisprudence governing the subject.
I have in mind the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, especially Rule 801(d)(2)(E) (the
co-conspirator declaration section), and the more recent Supreme Court decisions [in the
area].' 45
141 Marcus, Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 940.
142 While the Federal Rules of Evidence refer to the declaration matter as a nonhearsay offering, there
is little question that in fact this is hearsay, though coming within the guise of an exception. After all, as
with other forms of hearsay, these are statements which are offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The
court in United States v. Buettner-Janusch, 500 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 646 F.2d 759
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981), directed its attention to this matter:
We note in passing that ... the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1,
1975. In that new code, the admissibility of the hearsay statements of a co-conspirator
was codified, by a legislative finding that such statements are not hearsay. Like
Humpty Dumpty in "Through the Looking Glass," a legislative body, when it uses a
word such as "hearsay," can make that word mean what it wants to mean.
500 F. Supp. at 1292.
United States v. McDonald, 935 F.2d 1212, 1220 (11 th Cir. 1991). See generally Anderson v.
United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6 (4th Cir. 1974); Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926).
144 Letter from David Nimmer, Esq., to author (Jan. 31, 1991) (on file with author).
145 Letter from Hodges, supra note 35. Judge Hodges correctly noted that, while a conspiracy offense
need not be charged in order to have the evidence considered under the Federal Rules regarding co-conspira-
tor declarations, "many judges, including this one, are necessarily influenced by the framework of the
indictment in making evidentiary rulings, especially early on in the trial." See also the statement of District
Judge Marquez: "Another advantage, of course, is that the government can introduce any statements made in
furtherance of the conspiracy, during the conspiracy, and they probably would not be able to introduce the
statements if the conspiracy charge was not in the Indictment." Letter from Marquez, supra note 39.
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While the substance of the evidence law has remained the same in recent years,
many of the difficult questions of application which formerly were present have been
answered, almost entirely to the great satisfaction of the government. Even as recently as
ten years ago it was not at all certain: who applied the rules regarding the hearsay
exception, judge or jury; what the standard of proof was to be; whether the statements
themselves could be used to resolve the underlying evidentiary issue; and what the link
was to confessions made by co-conspirators under the Bruton case. 46 In four United
States Supreme Court decisions of the 1980's the answers to these questions were given.
The first of the Court's opinions dealt with a narrow but important issue, the
unavailability of the nontestifying co-conspirator. In United States v. Inadi,'47 the trial
judge admitted against the defendant statements which had been made by a co-conspirator.
The statements were offered under the traditional hearsay exception discussed above.' 48
The defendant objected because, he claimed, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment was violated absent a showing that the co-conspirator was unavailable to
testify at trial.'49 The Court recognized that the unavailability requirement existed with
respect to other forms of testimony, particularly relating to prior testimony. ° It would
not, however, extend this requirement to the co-conspirator declaration situation. In
refusing to extend the requirement, Justice Powell discussed the unique significance of co-
conspirator declarations: "[C]o-conspirator statements derive much of their value from the
fact that they are made in a context very different from trial, and therefore are usually
irreplaceable as substantive evidence."'' Hence, to exclude the statements without a
showing of unavailability would be "clear folly."'5 While the Court's position was
stated over vigorous dissent,'53 its holding clarified the law greatly,'14 and allowed for
the government to proceed without making any effort at all to produce the original
declarant.
The case which has had the greatest impact on conspiracy trials is Bourjaily v.
United States.'55 The Court resolved in that case a host of matters surrounding the co-
conspirator declaration rule. Initially Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that determinations
146 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
147 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
148 The trial judge specifically found that, as the statements were made during the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) was satisfied. Id. at 390.
149 The government's efforts to produce the declarant were limited at best. It subpoenaed him, but he
failed to appear, saying that he had had car trouble. Id.
150 In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) the Court construed the Confrontation Clause in the area
of prior testimony to require a searching inquiry into the unavailability of the declarant. See id. The Court
in Inadi wrote that "Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court
statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the deciarant is unavailable," thus
limiting the holding in Roberts to cases involving prior testimony. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
151 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395-96.
152 Id. at 396.
153 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented. He contended that the Confrontation
Clause did require such a showing of unavailability, particularly in light of the necessarily unreliable nature
of many co-conspirator declarations. He concluded that the Court's decision rested upon a judgment "that a
defendant's constitutional interest in subjecting the extrajudicial declarations of co-conspirators to the cross-
examination that has traditionally been the primary guarantee of reliability in trials must be subordinated to
considerations of prosecutorial efficiency." Id. at 411 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154 Many of the lower courts earlier had held that such showings of unavailability were necessary;
indeed the Third Circuit in Inadi found that the Roberts case established a constitutional rule which would
be applicable to all out-of-court statements. United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1984).
155 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
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concerning the rule 156 were to be made by the trial judge, not the jury.'57 This
decision was important, but was to pale in comparison to the other decisions yet to be
made. Connected to the question of who was to make these determinations was the matter
of the standard of proof to be used. The Court settled on the tried and true, a
preponderance of the evidence test.'58 These issues were undoubtly important, but not
tremendously controversial. The Court, iowever, had not finished.
In Glasser v. United States'59 the Supreme Court discussed the co-conspirator
declaration rule and found that such a declaration by a co-conspirator would only be
allowed if there was "proof aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy....
Otherwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent
evidence."" Most courts viewing Glasser had written that it meant that the hearsay
statements themselves could not be considered in deciding the necessary facts under the
co-conspirator declaration rule. The Court in Bourjaily disagreed. Looking to the language
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 16' and also to the legislative history,'62 the Court
held that the co-conspirators' statements could be used, as they could "be probative of the
existence of a conspiracy arid the participation of both the defendant and the declarant in
the conspiracy."'163 While the Court carefully chose not to decide whether the trial judge
could rely solely on the heaisay statement," it allowed the statement to be considered
along with other evidence. 6 5
156 The determinations, of course, went to whether the statement had been made by a member of the
conspiracy and during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
157 This cleared up an enormous amount of confusion regarding the interpretation of Rules 104(a) and
104(b) as to the proper function of trial court and jury dealing with preliminary questions. See Lawrence
Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigations: Putting the Conspiracy
Back in the Co-Conspirator Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1976); Paul Marcus, Co-Conspirator Declara-
tions: The Federal Rules of Evidence and Other Recent Developments, From a Criminal Law Perspective, 7
AM. J. CRIM. L. 287 (1979); Stephen Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27
STAN. L. REV. 271 (1975).
158 Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175.
159 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
160 Id. at 74-75 (citation omitted).
161 FED. R. EvID. 104(a) provides: "Preliminary questions concerning ... admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court .... In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence
except with those with respect to privileges." Id. It was this last sentence which Chief Justice Rehnquist
referred to in deciding that the Rules of Evidence had altered the traditional views concerning the hearsay
determination. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175.
162 The Advisory Committee Notes show that the Rule was not adopted in a fit of absent-
mindedness. The Note to FED. R. EvID. 104 specifically addresses the process by
which a federal court should make the factual determinations requisite to a finding of
admissibility:
"If the question is factual in nature, the judge will of necessity receive evidence pro
and con on the issue. The rule provides that the rules of evidence in general do not
apply to this process .... 'Sound sense backs the view that ... the judge should be
empowered to hear any relevant evidence, such as affidavits or other reliable hearsay."'
Id. at 178 n.2 (quoting E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 5 n.8 (3d ed. 1984)).
163 Id. at 180.
164 Id.
165 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, sharply disagreed with the majority's
reading of the Federal Rules along with the policy rationale given by the Court:
Thus, unlike many common-law hearsay exceptions, the co-conspirator exemption from
hearsay with its agency rationale was not based primarily upon any particular guaran-
tees of reliability or trustworthiness that were intended to ensure the truthfulness of the
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The final question before the Court in Bourjaily was an important one: did the
admission of the statement under the Federal Rules also satisfy the dictates of the
Confrontation Clause? The majority gave a resounding affirmative answer to this question,
finding that the requirements for the Rules and the Clause are identical. The issue focused
on the purported need of the government to offer independent "indicia of reliability," apart
from the statement itself."6 The Court stated that hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are designed to promote similar values and that if the evidence "falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception," '167 no additional evidence or inquiry would be needed.
Because the "co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is steeped in our
jurisprudence,"'168 the question essentially answered itself.
For the majority, the conclusion regarding the Confrontation Clause was easily
reached. For the dissenting Justices, however, the matter was not so simple. Justice
Blackmun, writing for himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall, challenged the
majority's basic premises, noting that "under common law, the reliability of the co-
conspirator's statement was never the primary ground justifying its admissibility.' 169
Moreover, Blackmun argued that the majority could not justify eliminating the reliability
inquiry when it had also eliminated the need for the courts to consider only non-hearsay
evidence: 7 0
Because the "firmly rooted hearsay exception" is defined in terms of its
"indicia of reliability" for Confrontation Clause purposes, a removal of
one of these "indicia" significantly transforms the co-conspirator
exemption in a relevant respect. In addition, this change takes away
from the exemption any weight that experience with its use by courts
may have given it, thus undermining its "firmly rooted" status. In sum,
the Court cannot have it both ways: it cannot transform the exemption,
as it admittedly does, and then avoid Confrontation Clause concerns by
conjuring up the "firmly rooted hearsay exception" as some benign
genie who will extricate the Court from its inconsistent analysis. 7'
admitted statement and to compensate for the fact that a party would not have the
opportunity to test its veracity by cross-examining the declarant.
Id. at 189 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 182.
167 Id. at 183 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
168 Id.
The admissibility of co-conspirators' statements was first established in this Court over
a century and a half ago ... and the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the exception as
accepted practice .... To the extent that these cases have not been superseded by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, they demonstrate that the co-conspirator exception of the
hearsay rule is steeped in our jurisprudence.. .. We think that these cases demon-
strate that co-conspirators' statements, when made in the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy, have a long tradition of being outside the compass of the general
hearsay exclusion.
Id.
169 Id. at 190. Justice Blackmun continued his attack on the majority's reliability focus: "The
Advisory Committee [on the Federal Rules of Evidence] explained that the exclusion of admissions from the
hearsay category is justified by the traditional 'adversary system' rationale, not by any specific 'guarantee of
trustworthiness' used to justify hearsay exceptions." Id. at 192.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 201.
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The Supreme Court also reviewed an area related to the declaration problem
discussed above, but in the situation in which the co-conspirator's statement would not
be admissible against the defendant. This involves the confession or other incriminating
statement which is made not during the conspiracy or in furtherance of it. The statement
is not part of the conspiracy, so it cannot be admitted under the hearsay exception.
Because it may be incriminating to all the parties, the statement can only be admitted
against the declarant. The difficulties in this area arose as a result of the Supreme Court's
decision in Bruton v. United States. 7 ' The majority in that case reiterated the key point
that the co-conspirator's statement could not be used against the defendant; such use
would violate the Confrontation Clause. 7 3 The question, however, was whether in a
joint trial the statement could be read to the jury if the jury was instructed that it could
use the statement only against the declarant, and not against the other persons incriminated
in the statement. Justice Brennan, in a strong opinion for the Court, rejected the
government argument that limiting instructions would suffice under the Constitution:
[Tihere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the
jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where
the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant,
who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately
spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incriminations
devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect.
174
One key question surfaced soon after the decision in Bruton: would the rule apply
if the defendant made her own statement and this statement tracked part of the co-
defendant's statement? In an earlier opinion on point, the Court deadlocked with regard
to the impact of this so-called "interlocking confession."'75 The matter was resolved in
Cruz v. New York.' 76 In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court held that Bruton
would apply in this situation and rejected the prosecution's argument that the defendant's
own statement would be so devastating to her case that the co-defendant's statement
simply did not matter:
In fact, it seems to us that "interlocking" bears a positively inverse
relationship to devastation. A codefendant's confession will be relatively
harmless if the incriminating story it tells is different from that which
the defendant himself is alleged to have told, but enormously damaging
if it confirms, in all essential respects, the defendant's alleged confes-
sion. It might be otherwise if the defendant were standing by his
confession, in which case it could be said that the codefendant's
confession does no more than support the defendant's very own case.
172 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
173 Id. at 135-36.
174 Id.
175 In Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979), four members of the Court took the view that Bruton
would always be inapplicable in the situation involving interlocking confessions. Four other Justices
rejected this stringent rule and instead considered that the matter should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Id.
176 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
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But in the real world of criminal litigation, the defendant is seeking to
avoid his confession - on the ground that it was not accurately
reported, or that it was not really true when made.'77
A more intense debate concerned the other Bruton issue. Richardson v.
Marsh178 brought this matter to the Court. In that case the references to the defendant
in the co-defendant's statement had been dutifully redacted. The defendant, however,
argued that the jury would know to whom the confession referred, based upon other
evidence heard by the jury which tied the two defendants together. Justice Scalia again
wrote for the majority, but this time his view was considerably less sympathetic to the
defense position. He disputed the contention that jurors would necessarily realize that the
defendant was being incriminated in the redacted co-defendant's statement and would
necessarily not follow the instruction to apply the statement only to the declarant. He
distinguished Bruton'79 because in that case the statement expressly implicated the
defendant. In Richardson, however, "the confession was not incriminating on its face, and
became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial .... Where the
necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not
likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence."' 80
Once again, the majority's opinion drew a sharp response, here in the form of
Justice Stevens' dissent.'' He could not understand why the jurors would be more
likely to follow the trial court's limiting instruction if the co-defendant's statement did not
directly implicate the defendant, as opposed to what had taken place in Bruton."s2 He
referred to the majority's holding as an "illogical result [which] demeans the values
protected by the Confrontation Clause."' 83 For Stevens, the problem in this area was the
government's insistence that the two defendants be tried together. The solution, then, was
simple, severance:
The facts that joint trials conserve prosecutorial resources, diminish
inconvenience to witnesses, and avoid delays in the administration of
criminal justice have been well known for a long time. It is equally well
known that joint trials create special risks of prejudice to one of the
defendants, and that such risks often make it necessary to grant
177 Id. at 192 (emphasis added). Justice White in dissent (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Powell and O'Connor) could not understand why Bruton would apply when the defendant herself made an
incriminating statement. He cited his earlier opinion in Bruton:
The defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence
that can be admitted against him. Though itself an out-of-court statement, it is
admitted as reliable evidence because it is an admission of guilt by the defendant and
constitutes direct evidence of the facts to which it relates. Even the testimony of an
eyewitness may be less reliable than the defendant's own confession. An observer
may not correctly perceive, understand, or remember the acts of another, but the
admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and
unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct.
Id. at 195. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 139-40 (White, J., dissenting)).
178 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
179 Id. at 208.
I0 Id. See generally United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698, 700-01 (2d Cir. 1991).
181 He was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211.
182 Id. at 211-12.
183 Id. at 212.
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severances. The Government argues that the costs of requiring the
prosecution to choose between severance and not offering the code-
fendant's confession at a joint trial outweigh the benefits to the
defendant. On the scales of justice, however, considerations of fairness
normally outweigh administrative concerns.
8 4
The line of Supreme Court decisions during the last decade has dramatically
changed the practice in terms of hearsay evidence offered at conspiracy trials. The
principles with respect to the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause are
now quite clear. While not all uncertainties are behind us,8 5 the strong direction of the
Court unquestionably encourages even greater use of co-defendant declarations in joint
conspiracy trials. 8 6 United States District Judge Thomas Flannery of the District of
Columbia, himself a former United States Attorney, stated the matter well: "The
prosecutor has an easy task in introducing damaging evidence against co-conspirators
because of the relaxed rules in conspiracy cases."'
8 7
5. Punishment for the Conspiracy
Punishment for the completed conspiracy crime has always been stiff. Because
the crime is viewed as substantively apart from the object, a completed (or attempted)
184 Id. at 217 (citations omitted).
I5 1 think here of two key open questions: Under Bourjaily can the sole evidence to demonstrate a
conspiracy be the hearsay statement itself (the Court clearly left this question open); and, under Richardson,
would there be any instances in which a redaction would be ineffective under the Confrontation Clause? On
the former question, see United States v. Chestang, 849 F.2d 528, 531 (11 th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1402 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Silverman, 861
F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1988) went even beyond this question: "Because of this presumptive unreliability, a
co-conspirator's statement implicating the defendant in the alleged conspiracy must be corroborated by fairly
incriminating evidence. Evidence of wholly innocuous conduct or statements by the defendant will rarely be
sufficiently corroborative of the co-conspirator's statement to constitute proof .. " On the latter question,
see United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1279-80 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Espinoza-Seanez, 862
F.2d 526, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1988). In Foster v. United States, 548 A.2d 1370, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(citations omitted) the court remarked:
It appears to us that somewhere along the continuum from Bruton to Richardson v.
Marsh, one reaches a point where one cannot have the requisite degree of assurance
that the jury will not improperly consider the evidence in deciding the guilt of the
defendant against whom the evidence is not admissible despite a proper limiting
instruction .... We hold that a properly and effective redacted statement substituting
neutral references for names (including nicknames and the like) and/or descriptions
(such as "the white guy" ... or "the thin man") may be admitted into evidence at a
joint trial (when coupled with proper limiting instructions) unless a "substantial risk"
exists that the jury will consider that statement in deciding the guilt of the defendant.
Id.
186 Justice Stevens, in Richardson, discussed the high number of joint-defendant cases in the criminal
courts, noting that during the five-year period before the case was decided almost 11,000 federal criminal
trials involved more than one defendant. That number accounted for almost one-third of all federal criminal
trials in the United States. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 218.
187 Letter from Flannery, supra note 7.7.
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offense,'88 it does not usually merge into that other offense.'89 As a result, the
convicted conspirator may receive consecutive sentences for the two crimes and even may
receive a greater offense for the conspiracy than for the completed crime. 90 One
viewing this system of punishment might conclude that the problem is one of serious and
widespread nature. Actually, relatively few individuals receive consecutive sentences for
the conspiracy and for the completed offense,'9 ' and virtually no one in recent years has
received more time of imprisonment for the conspiracy than for the completed crime.92
In recent times developments have occurred which promise to figure prominently
in the resulting punishment for the conspiracy. Two, in particular, are worthy of special
note. The first is a double jeopardy decision of the Supreme Court, Grady v. Corbin.'93
The Court held that the government would be barred from bringing a later prosecution if,
to do so, it would have to "prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted."' 94 This development may be enormous,
requiring, in the words of dissenting Justice Scalia, "that all charges arising out of a single
occurrence must be joined in a single indictment." ' Because a large overriding
conspiracy might be viewed as just such a "single occurrence," the Court's ruling may
affect the ability of the government to bring multiple conspiracy charges relating to one
agreement, at least in certain circumstances. It is too early, however, to see whether the
impact will be as great as seems possible; the lower courts are grappling with the matter
at this time.'96
The other development which certainly will have great impact is the adoption of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Under the Guidelines the facts of the conspiracy, and
188 The Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) said that the two
offenses were separate: "If the overt act be the offense which was the object of the conspiracy, and is also
punished, there is not a double punishment of it." Id.
189 "[It is] the general principle that a conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its immediate end
are discrete crimes for which separate sanctions may be imposed." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770,
771 (1975). Some states by statute require that the conspiracy merge into the completed crime. See, e.g.,
GA. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-8 (Mitchie 1988).
190 "It has long been the rule that Congress has the power to provide for persons convicted of
conspiracy a punishment more severe than that provided for persons actually committing the act." United
States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 242 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986) (citation
omitted). The rationale for such a proposition is difficult to understand, as it is hard to justify punishing the
agreement to commit an offense in a more severe fashion than the offense which was the object of that
agreement. See Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Prosecution of Individual
Defendants, 62 HARV. L. REV. 276 (1948).
191 The earlier survey demonstrated that relatively few cases involve consecutive sentencing for both
the conspiracy charge and the substantive crime. One question asked how often a defendant would receive
consecutive sentencing for the two, and well over 70% of the respondents (over 80% of the prosecutors)
indicated that such an event took place less than 10% of the time. Marcus, Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 938.
192 Almost no reported cases are present which apply this dubious doctrine. Moreover, some courts
go out of their way to ensure that the doctrine will not be applied. See, e.g., the court's refusal to extend the
state's "lifer law" to conspirators in People v. Jahner, 446 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. 1989). See also People v.
Agriesti, 548 N.E.2d 42 (Ill. 1989).
193 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
194 Id. at 510.
Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 921 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 178 (1990);
United States v. Calderon, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court very recently narrowed Grady,
but in the context of prosecutions for a substantive offense with a conspiracy charge. See United States v.
Felix, 118 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1992).
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an individual's role in it, must be factored into the sentence equation by the trial
judge.'97 We already are seeing much litigation at the sentencing stage concerning the
nature of the conspiracy and the role of the conspirators.198
With these two developments, the law is moving tapidly, but it is still too soon
to determine how rapidly. While the potential is tremendous, the number of cases in
which significant holdings have occurred is still quite limited. In one area, however, the
impact on punishment has become clear, and that impact already has been substantial. I
refer here to the situation in which the government charges violations of multiple
conspiracy statutes based upon a single agreement. The case of consequence is Albernaz
v. United States.'99 The story begins, however, forty years before that 1981 case.
In 1942 the Supreme Court decided Braverman v. United States.2" The
government in that case charged the defendants with multiple crimes, based on their single
agreement which had multiple objectives. The government argued that each crime was a
different violation of a single conspiracy statute. The government conceded, though, that
"only a single agreement to commit the offenses alleged was proven. 22 ' Without clearly
identifying the basis for its holding,2 °2 the Court strongly disapproved of the
prosecution. The Court unanimously found that the criminal activity was the single
agreement, an agreement which could not be carved up to accommodate multiple
conspiracy charges:
For when a single agreement to commit one or more substantive crimes
is evidenced by an overt act, as the statute requires, the precise nature
and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the
agreement which embraces and defines its objects. Whether the object
of a single agreement is to commit one or many crimes, it is in either
case that agreement which constitutes the conspiracy which the statute
punishes. The one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements
and hence several conspiracies because it envisages the violation of
several statutes rather than one.20 3
197 The issues here are principally definitional, such as who is a "minor" participant as opposed to
being a leader or organizer. See United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
198 The cases in the area already are legion. See, e.g., United States v. Puma, 937 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.
1991); United States v. Perrone, 936 F.2d 1403 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Audelo-Sanchez, 923 F.2d
129 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pregler, 925 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cagle, 922 F.2d
404 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 1625 (1990);
United States v. Cardenas, 917 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Hester, 917 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir.
1990).
199 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
200 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
201 Id. at 52.
202 Several possibilities come to mind, including the question of legislative intent as well as the
constitutional problem of violations of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
203 Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53.
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For a time, Braverman was applied broadly °4 and stood for the principle that
one agreement could not be used as the basis of multiple conspiracy convictions. 25 The
holding in Albernaz, however, greatly limited this principle. The agreement there violated
two specific drug conspiracy sections found in Title 21 of the United States Code, sections
846 and 963. Some judges took the view that the presence of the multiple conspiracy
sections should not affect the outcome 0 6 because Braverman required the dismissal of
all but one conspiracy charge if only a single agreement had been shown.0 7 The Chief
Justice disagreed. He began by finding a Congressional intent to impose separate
punishment for the violations of two specific conspiracy statutes. "Sections 846 and 963
specify different ends as the proscribed object of the conspiracy - distribution as opposed
to importation - and it is beyond peradventure that 'each provision requires proof of a
fact [that] the other does not.""'20
Regarding the constitutional claim that multiple conspiracy charges would violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court was not persuaded. It viewed the constitutional
inquiry narrowly: "The 'dispositive question' [is] whether Congress intended to authorize
separate punishment for the two crimes. This is so because the 'power to define criminal
offenses and to prescribe punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of them,
resides wholly with the Congress.""'2 °
The Albernaz holding, allowing multiple sentences for a single agreement, has
been used in a host of cases during the last ten years, 10 and can be expected to be used
even more extensively in connection with the declared war on drugs. This principle must
be questioned, however, and not simply on the ground that it appears to conflict with
204 See, e.g., United States v. George, 752 F.2d 749 (lOst Cir. 1985); United States v. Corral, 578 F.2d
570 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Mori, 444 F.2d 240 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971).
205 Of course, the conspirators could be convicted of having participated in multiple substantive
offenses if such statutory sections were, in fact, violated. The focus here is entirely on violations of
conspiracy statutes.
206 At least where the evidence on both was identical.
207 See United States v. Rodriguez, 612 F.2d 906, 926 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original):
My brethren acknowledge the authority of Braverman but make an effort to distinguish
it, saying that it limits only "the Government's ability to fragment a single conspiracy
under the general conspiracy statute." This is not an adequate basis for reaching a
different result from the one determined in Braverman. Here there was but one
conspiracy regardless whether it is declared illegal by what my brethren consider two
discreet laws ... or by one law .... However, whether there was one statute or two,
there was one agreement and, as the Court said in Braverman: "The one agreement
cannot be taken to be several agreements and hence several conspiracies because it
envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one." I see little difference
between fragmenting a conspiracy according to the number and diversity of its
objectives in order to charge several violations of a single statute, and using the same
technique to charge violations of two statutory provisions. The teaching of Braverman
is that a conspiracy cannot be so fragmented.
Id.
208 United States v. Albemaz, 450 U.S. 333, 339 (1981). Chief Justice Rehnquist was making
reference here to the earlier double jeopardy opinion in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932), in which the Court found that the test to determine whether there were two offenses or one "is
whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id.
209 Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344.
210 See generally United States v. Simpson, 901 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1990); Timberlake v. United
States, 767 F.2d 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1985); United States v. Mulherin, 710 F.2d
731 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 964 (1983).
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earlier Supreme Court precedent. The conclusion remains inescapable that individuals are
being punished more than once for having engaged in a single criminal venture, the
conspiratorial agreement. Apart from the presumed legislative intent on point, surely such
punishment must raise extremely troublesome issues of jeopardy and questions about the
reach of legislative action. The very real possibility of such a multiple sentencing scheme
leaves little doubt that conspirators now will be even more likely to seek the comfort zone
of a negotiated plea agreement.2 '
IV. WHERE ARE WE GOING?
The law of conspiracy has developed over a long and twisted path toward the
broad and powerful doctrine that is currently applied. What may be most troubling,
though, are the grave concerns present on the road yet to be traveled.
A. Mega-trials
"As a general rule, defendants who have been jointly indicted should be tried
together, particulaily in conspiracy cases. '2 12 This view has been the foundation for
multiple-defendant conspiracy trials for most of this century. When combined with the
traditional reluctance of trial judges to grant severance motions, 2 13 it insures that many
joint trials will appear in the criminal justice system. Looking to the joint trials during the
recent past,21 4 there is much concern over the complexity of future joint trials. Judge
Hodges referred to the "proliferation of conspiracy prosecutions - or, more accurately,
conspiracy counts''2'5 during the last twenty years. Judge Hodges carefully chose his
words: there truly has been a proliferation of trials involving large numbers of defendants
and charges.2 6
With these large trials, dubbed "mega-trials" by many, serious questions have
been raised about whether individual defendants can receive fair and thorough treatment
from jurors. The language of Chief Judge Bauer of the Seventh Circuit is striking:
The trial can become - and frequently does - vastly complicated and
damned near impossible to understand. The length of trials can be
measured in months with dozens and dozens of witnesses and hundreds
of documents. The result has been an increasing unease as to whether
all the defendants are securing a fair trial and a real wonder as to
whether the jurors can, as well, follow either the evidence or the
complicated instructions necessary in such an endeavor.
211 In the earlier survey, when asked what motivated prosecutors to bring a conspiracy charge where
the object offense had already been completed or attempted, significant numbers of individuals (more than
35% of the prosecuting and defense attorneys) indicated that the presence of a conspiracy charge created
advantages in connection with plea bargaining. Marcus, Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 942.
212 United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 1037 (11th Cir. 1991).
213 See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
214 The large cases are not only of very recent vintage. See, e.g., Capriola v. United States, 61 F.2d 5
(7th Cir.) (59 defendants), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 671 (1932); Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.)
(75 defendants), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 597 (1924).
215 Letter from Hodges, supra note 35.
216 Long complex trials during the past ten years have involved drugs, bonds, securities frauds,
commodities matters, currency exchanges, weapons, and banking and savings industry issues.
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Recently in a trial before Judge George Marovich of the
Northern District of Illinois, the government spent twelve weeks putting
on its case, the defendant spent two weeks, and the jury was out for
nearly a month before returning verdicts on 320 counts, including
conspiracy and RICO counts. The original indictment was over 700
counts but His Honor managed to shave it down by pretrial rulings.1 7
Can jurors truly understand the evidence and sort it out when the trials take
months, involve dozens of defendants and hundreds of charges allegedly occurring over
many years? One must be skeptical. Judge Aspen of Chicago refused to accept the
traditional view of the need for large joint trials in the El Rukn proceedings 218 when he
saw the serious potential for harm to individual defendants:
It has long been assumed that the advantages referred to above
adequately support a strong presumption in favor of joint trials and
against severance. Thus, to prevail in a motion for severance, a
defendant ordinarily "must show that she could not possibly have a fair
trial without a severance." However, the recent proliferation of complex,
multi-defendant trials in this district and others, prompted in large part
by RICO, has raised doubts about the foundations of this onerous
burden. Some courts, when faced with a multitude of defendants
indicted together under the expansive RICO umbrella, have questioned
the wisdom of blindly embracing the purported advantages of a joint
trial while, at the same time, disregarding the manifest difficulties pre-
sented by what is commonly called a "mega-trial.". . . Accordingly, a
strong presumption in favor of joint trials is not justified in the context
of an inordinately complex mega-trial like the one proposed here, where
the principal nexus between the charges is that the defendants allegedly
were associated with the same criminally-oriented gang.219
The threat to defendants is seen by experienced trial lawyers as an intense and
troubling problem. Jeffrey Weiner of Miami has worked as a lawyer exclusively in the
criminal justice area for the past fifteen years. He wrote of his experience:
The major change I have witnessed over the last two decades concern-
ing the prosecution of conspiracy cases is the recent recognition by a
growing number of federal judges that massive, mega-conspiracy trials
deny defendants essential constitutional rights (i.e., right to counsel,
right to due process) and take an undue toll on the judiciary and
criminal justice system. Criminal defense attorneys have voiced urgent
complaints in routine severance motions about this pernicious practice
over the last two decades as this governmental tactic has grown.
However, these complaints have largely gone unanswered by the federal
judges. The problem was, perhaps, first brought to the forefront during
the pendency of the New York Pizza-connection case, a multi-defen-
dant, mega conspiracy trial that lasted in excess of 18 months and
217 Letter from Bauer, supra note 33 (emphasis in original).
218 United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. Il.), severance order revised, id. at 1197
(1990).
219 Id. at 1171-72 (citations omitted).
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resulted in the heart attack of an NACDL member representing one of
the co-defendants. During the lawyers absence for several months, his
client's name was not even mentioned!
220
If the number of large, complex trials is high, and if the tradition of resisting
severance requests remains,22' what, then, will happen in the future? The first, and easy,
prediction, is that there will continue to be more of the same, many complicated and long
trials. This prediction, though, may be too facile and itself may be open to serious
question. Dan Webb is the former United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois and is currently a partner in a prominent Chicago law firm. In discussing his
concerns, he expressed his belief that changes may occur because prosecutors will come
to realize that these large trials may not be to their advantage:
As a prosecutor, Webb "convicted everybody" in the trial involving 23
Chicago police officers in the 1970s. But, he said, the facts were
relatively simple.
"A year later, in the Teamster Pension Fund case, . . . a
complicated fraud case, I lost every defendant," Webb said. "They were
not guilty on over 100 charges. What I learned and what is re-empha-
sized with the yen and Swiss franc cases is that the government has
enormous difficulty in winning the complex financial fraud cases when
it's a mega-defendant trial."
When jurors become confused, "they react against the
government, and they penalize the government and find the defendants
not-guilty or get hung," Webb said. "Jurors are the best form of street
justice. They are punishing the government for having done wrong for
indicting so many people. The government is hoisted on its own
petard. ,2
2
220 Letter from Weiner, supra note 28. The court in United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 799 (2d
Cir. 1991) (citations omitted) was candid in its discussion:
For better or for worse, our circuit in recent years seems to have been the
locus for "megatrials". ("This appeal stems from what can only optimistically be
called an aberration in the federal judicial system - the RICO megatrial."); ("The
[RICO pattern] problem is of serious consequence because a RICO trial often becomes
a 'megatrial' with large numbers of unrelated defendants -- charged with unconnected
wrongs - tried together under the rubric of a single conspiracy.").
Defendants are often heard to complain that the government benefits from
the ambiguity and confusion which accompanies these gargantuan indictments; despite
the complaints, we have responded, sometimes grudgingly, by affirming the lion's
share of the convictions in spite of our concerns about the unruliness of such cases.
Similarly, defendants often complain that, because of the diversity of proof
admissible in such an enormous case, they suffer not only from "prejudicial spillover,"
such as occurs "where a minor participant in one conspiracy was forced to sit through
weeks of damaging evidence relating to another," but also from prejudice transferred
across the line separating conspiracies, or defendants, "so great that no one really can
say prejudice to substantial right has not taken place."
Id.
221 This tradition is beginning to change in some important ways. See infra text accompanying notes
226-33.
222 Donna Gill, Megatrials: Take-a-Number Justice, CHI. LAW., May 1991, at 1, 55. Some
prosecutors will still resist severance under any circumstances. Note the exasperation expressed by the judge
in the Andrews case:
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Defense counsel will certainly continue to push for smaller and more compact
trial groupings. Prosecutors may have the incentive in some matters to charge in smaller
numbers. Other pressures may also become pronounced as experience with these "mega-
trials" becomes more publicized and more controversial. The most striking development
in recent times, and one which can be expected to be repeated, is action taken by trial
judges to split apart these large cases.223 Trial judges have begun, in Judge Bauer's
words, "sua sponte requiring the prosecution to make elections and severing both counts
and defendants.'224 Even critic Weiner shares this perception. "[Recently] several
enlightened district court judges have granted severances citing fairness to the defendants
and the intolerable burden to the criminal justice system produced by these mega-
trials."225
Among the most prominent judges acting to limit the size and scope of trials was
Judge Aspen of Chicago in the El Rukn case discussed above.226 There, in ordering
severance, he wrote:
It is fanciful to believe that any jury would be able, or even willing, to
intelligently and thoroughly deliberate over the enormous volume of
evidence expected at a single trial of this action. In its present form, the
Because at this stage of the proceedings the government is the only party with
complete knowledge of the evidence that it will present in this case, it is in the best
position to suggest an efficient and effective severance plan. However, unfortunately,
it has declined our previous requests to participate in the formulation of such a plan.
On two separate occasions we gave the government an opportunity to set forth a
scheme to sever this unwieldy indictment .... Unfortunately, on both of these
occasions the government refused and instead insisted that the case could only be tried
as indicted.
Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1181 (footnote omitted).
223 Some, including Judge Aspen, are not encouraged with respect to involvement by the appellate
courts in this area: "After a lengthy trial resulting in conviction, the denial of severance is, understandably,
rarely overturned .... Simply put, appellate courts, by virtue of their role in the judicial system, are not in a
position to effectively deter the mega-trial."
Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1180-81 (footnote omitted). See United States v. Olivo-Infante, 938 F.2d 1406,
1409 (1st Cir. 1991) (citation omitted):
A district court's denial of a motion to sever "is addressed to the discretion of the trial
court and should not be reversed without a strong showing of prejudice." We will
reverse only if that discretion is abused, denying the defendant a fair trial and resulting
in a miscarriage of justice.
Id.; see also United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1095-96 (5th Cir. 1991). There are cases, however,
which show the more assertive nature of appellate courts in this area. See, e.g., United States v. Davidson,
936 F.2d 856, 861 (6th Cir. 1991), in which the court concluded that the defendant was denied a fair trial.
Id. In Davidson, a co-defendant was tried in absentia and evidence offered against that co-defendant had a
"spillover effect" on the defendant. Id.; see also United States v. Nicely, 922 F.2d 850, 860-61 (D.C. Cir.
1991):
The government overreached in joining these two conspiracies in a single indictment.
While reviewing courts can and do indulge a presumption in favor of joinder to serve
the interests of judicial economy, we cannot condone the government's sloppy
assimilation of charges that have no logical relationship to one another and whose
joinder infringes on defendants' constitutional rights to a fair trial. "Symbiosis" is no
substitute for an articulable connection between otherwise disparate conspiracies.
Id.
224 Letter from Bauer, supra note 33.
225 Letter from Weiner, supra note 28.
226 See supra text accompanying notes 56-65.
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trial would involve twenty-two to twenty-nine defendants accused of
over 150 factually separate criminal acts spanning a period of over
twenty years and involving at least twenty-five different provisions of
the state and federal penal codes. The government concedes that the
volume of evidence at such a trial would be "massive," and we find that
solely by virtue of its volume the evidence would be equally "complex."
After this long and arduous trial, the jury would be required to sift
through a virtual warehouse of evidence to determine what items were
presented against which defendant and as to which criminal act. It
would then be obliged to resolve a plethora of difficult factual issues
and to strictly apply the detailed and complex law as provided by
hundreds of pages of jury instructions. The inevitable length of such a
trial dramatically increases the difficulty of this Herculean task. Both
common sense and scientific study dictate that as the volume of
evidence and corresponding length of trial increases, the degree and
quality of jury comprehension decreases proportionately. To expect any
jury to accurately recall and appraise the vast amount of detailed
testimonial and documentary evidence it heard many months or even a
year earlier is unrealistically optimistic.227
The ruling of New York Federal Judge Weinstein in United States v. Gallo228
received widespread attention. In that case the government charged sixteen individuals
with organized crime acts over two decades.229 Judge Weinstein wrote that the case was
227 Andrews, 754 F. Supp. at 1176 (citations and footnotes omitted).
228 668 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
229 In another major organized crime case in the Second Circuit the court on appeal affirmed the
denial of the severance motions but developed specific rules regarding these large cases. The court
discussed its "misgivings about trials of this magnitude."
We are aware that lengthy multi-defendant trials may provide certain benefits in terms
of the judicial system, however, they also can have disadvantages. We recognize the
evident disadvantages which can occur in these mega-trials; we also recognize that
district judges must retain a considerable degree of discretion in determining whether,
on balance, the fair administration of justice will be better served by one aggregate
trial of all indicted defendants or by two or more trials of groups of defendants.
However, we believe that some benchmarks ought to be set out to guide the exercise
of that discretion. First, the district judge should elicit from the prosecutor a good-
faith estimate of time reasonably anticipated to present the government's case. Though
the prosecutor's estimate should not become the subject of a contested hearing, the
judge need not accept the estimate without question but should be free to make an
independent assessment based on various factors including the number of defendants,
the time and territorial scope of the crimes charged, the number of witnesses likely to
be called, and the number and size of exhibits likely to be introduced, including
wiretaps.
United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151-52 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 495 U.S.
933, and 495 U.S. 958 (1990). The Second Circuit is hardly the first court to raise these concerns on
appeals. More than 60 years ago the Tenth Circuit in Marcante v. United States, 49 F.2d 156, 158 (10th Cir.
1931) (23 defendants had been tried at the same time) wrote:
Furthermore, the practice of submitting to a jury, in one trial, the question of the guilt
of thirty or fifty citizens, where the testimony as to each is different, is not to be
encouraged. It is extremely difficult for an experienced trial judge to trace the skeins
of scattered testimony to so many individuals; with inexperienced jurors, such compli-
cated testimony is too apt to become but a confused jumble, and a verdict too apt to
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of a complex and "labyrinthian nature."23 He remarked that "[a]s the number of counts
and defendants in an indictment increases, 'it is obvious' that the resultant complex trial
record makes it more difficult for a jury to keep straight the specific evidence and charges
against each defendant. '23' As a result, he ordered the massive trial broken into separate
trial segments. 2  This judicial behavior must be applauded. Undoubtedly there will be
cases in which jurors can sort the evidence against the many defendants. Still, when there
will be months and months of testimony against many various defendants, judges and
prosecutors should retain a healthy degree of doubt concerning the ability of jurors to
achieve true justice. 3
Thank God occasionally a jurist will say... "Enough is enough, and
justice requires a severance. ' 234
represent an impression that the defendants are guilty of something, with little refer-
ence to the crime with which they are charged.
Id.
230 Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 739.
231 Id. at 749.
Trials in these "monster" cases have constituted an enormous burden on the courts, as
well as on defendants, the defense bar, jurors, and even prosecutors. The court must
coordinate the schedules of scores of persons for months on end. The absence of one
juror, one defendant, one defense attorney, one prosecutor, or even some witnesses,
can throw a clog into the trial that brings it to a halt. Some of these trials are now
continuing for well over one year, with comparable time spent on pre-trial matters.
Id. at 754 (citation omitted).
232 Id. at 758-60. His order carefully severed the case based upon the parties, the time frame, and the
evidence to be offered against individuals.
233 Some of the cases currently being tried must raise tremendous questions about the ability of an
individual defendant to get a fair trial. Judge Weinstein in the Gallo case referred to three. One involved a
17-month trial where over three years had gone by between indictment and verdict; another was a trial which
was still going on more than four years after the indictment had been returned; and a third trial took four
months for jury selection and was estimated to run for over a year. Id. at 754. Judge Aspen in the Andrews
case also discussed some of these incredibly difficult cases, such as United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971
(5th Cir. 1981) (only 120 pages of a 12,000 page transcript related to the defendant's activities), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1136 and 459 U.S. 906 (1982); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976) (25 pages
of testimony related to the defendant out of a total record of more than 50 volumes); United States v. Kelly,
349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.) (in a nine-month trial the defendant's name was first mentioned three months into the
case and then only briefly thereafter), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1965). United States v. Andrews, 754 F.
Supp. 1161, 1172 (N.D. I11. 1990). See also this statement by former trial judge and now United States
Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
I see little justification for multiple indictments with counts numbering in the hun-
dreds. Of course, the decision to prosecute, as well as much of the composition of the
charges themselves, is within the constitutionally fenced preserve of the Executive
Branch of government. Once the indictments are signed and filed, however, I take the
view that the matter of prosecution becomes a shared responsibility between the
Article 2 and 3 branches of the government. [As a trial judge] I have had some
success in severing out and sequencing trials to overcome the problems of the unduly
lengthened indictment.
Judges Manual for the Management of Complex Criminal Jury Trials § 2.7 at 10-11 (1982).
234 Defense attorney Harvey Silets, quoted in Gill, supra note 222, at 55.
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B. What is the Point of this Crime?
Some time ago, in an influential article, Professor Phillip Johnson asked whether
the criminal conspiracy doctrine served any useful purpose in our justice system. The title
of the article gives his answer, "The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy. '"235 Other
theories - accomplice liability, the crime of solicitation, completed crimes - would,
Johnson argued, handle the vast majority of matters that would otherwise be prosecuted
as conspiracies." 6 Other commentators, including this writer, agreed in principle with
Johnson but felt that the conspiracy crime served an important purpose in the relatively
small number of cases involving large-scale agreements spanning the country (and,
increasingly, the world).237 Judge Thomas Flannery of the District of Columbia stated
the proposition nicely:
Conspiracy charges should be utilized in prosecutions against major
criminals and those law breakers who are engaged in sophisticated
criminal endeavors involving violation of the public trust such as, the
savings and loan scandals, bank fraud and other crimes involving
defendants who had planned and committed very serious crimes.
238
Viewing the manner in which conspiracy cases are actually charged must give
serious pause to Johnson's critics; we must ask the question, do we really need the crime
of conspiracy in today's world? At one end of the spectrum, in support of Johnson's view,
is the way in which conspiracy crimes are brought. Conspiracy is charged in many cases
in which simpler and narrower crimes would handle the legislative goals quite nicely. The
point was made by Judge Flannery: "I have had cases brought in my court charging two
defendants in a conspiracy count involving three or four sales of narcotics where the
alleged duration of the conspiracy was several weeks. This to me is an example where
the use of the conspiracy charge is abused." '239 In such cases, it can hardly be said that
the government is going after sophisticated criminal endeavors, arguably the basis for the
retention of conspiracy law.
At the other end of the spectrum, where the government really prosecuted large
criminal groupings, the conspiracy doctrine traditionally worked well as a tool - actually
the only tool - to join individuals and crimes in a manner comprehensible to jurors.
Increasingly, however, the federal. and state RICO statutes take that role. With a
broadened scope of enterprise liability, as opposed to agreement responsibility,24 ° the
government can prosecute people and offenses which it could not prosecute under the
relatively narrower conspiracy doctrine.24 ' Judge Aspen in the Andrews case explained
the breadth of the RICO doctrine in terms of the rules regarding joinder of parties and
defendants:
235 Johnson, supra note 4, at 1137.
236 Without the attendant and - it is believed by many - undue advantages for the government, such
as the rules of venue, the co-conspirator declaration doctrine, consecutive sentencing, and the wide
complicity rules.
237 Marcus, Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 966.
238 Letter from Flannery, supra note 77.
239 Id.
240 See supra notes 70-75.
241 The advantages for the RICO prosecutions are many, including the breadth of enterprise liability,
forfeiture rules, and the basic notion that a convicted defendant - even in a relatively minor white collar
endeavor - will be viewed as a racketeer.
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This case provides a vivid example of the broad charging authority that
RICO has conferred to the government. Prior to RICO, the scope of a
proper indictment under Rule 8(b) was largely restricted to the number
of individuals who could conspire to commit a single substantive crime.
RICO removes this natural "ceiling" by making it a crime to agree to
the commission of a "pattern of racketeering," which can include a
limitless number of substantive crimes and, consequently, a limitless
number of conspirators. Thus, RICO evades the practical limitations of
group conduct that Rule 8(b) places on the scope of an indictment.
"[T]he government, through its ability to craft the indictment, is the
master of the scope of the charged RICO conspiracy .... [It] can be
broad or narrow depending on the number of predicate crimes within
the scope of the agreement that the government chooses to identify."
Here, for example, the government could have indicted an
additional 21 alleged El Rukn conspirators who were indicted separately
in another case in this district. The defendants there include those who
allegedly were the drug suppliers to the organization and El Rukn
members who held positions as "ambassadors," the organization's fourth
level of command. The indictment here could also have included a
multitude of named unindicted co-conspirators. Further, if the breadth
of the alleged El Rukn enterprise is as expansive as the government
suggests, the defendants indicted here could number in the hundreds, or,
theoretically, even in the thousands. Such an indictment would
presumably comply with Rule 8(b) as long as each of the defendants
allegedly agreed to the "overall objective," a violation of RICO.242
Having concluded that conspiracy need not be seen as a vital force in terms of
the ordinary street crime situation or even the large scale joint criminal endeavors, am I
suggesting that the crime of conspiracy will disappear soon? Not at all. Conspiracy is an
effective and logical way to present a large case involving many defendants and multiple
counts. Moreover, in many jurisdictions the government does not use RICO often, and
many people perceive that it may be "overkill" in cases other than the most serious
endeavors.243 No, the crime of conspiracy will survive for the foreseeable future.
Indeed, virtually all respondents view conspiracy as a major weapon in the government
arsenal2" and believe that it will continue as such. District Judge Bilby of Arizona
stated that conspiracy "is a tool that is overused and I predict will be used even more in
the future." '245 Judge Mikva of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit wrote, "I think that the use of the conspiracy tool will ebb and flow as
the society gets more or less concerned about white collar crime, organized crime and
organized violent crime." '246 Judge Schroeder of the Ninth Circuit was able to "foresee
242 United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161, 1170 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (citations omitted).
243 See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
244 Robert Brosio, then Chief Assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles, now head of the
Federal Drug Enforcement Agency, commented that "[i]n virtually every multiple defendant case there is a
conspiracy charge, except those cases where the substantive offense does not involve any serious conspiracy,
such as bank robbery or check theft."' Marcus, Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 947 n.74.
245 Letter from Bilby, supra note 38. Judge Bilby stated the matter succinctly: "[The conspiracy
offense] will undoubtedly be used more frequently; the obvious evidentiary advantages make it too attractive
not to be used." Id.
246 Letter from Mikva, supra note 89.
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conspiracy to remain a major tool in the future for the prosecution of white collar, violent
and organized crime.'247 Judge Flannery's thoughts complete the predictions:
It seems to me that prosecutors will use conspiracy as the basis for
bringing such prosecutions with increasing frequency. The advantages
in bringing such prosecutions are heavily weighted in favor of the
prosecutors and I can perceive no reason why prosecutors will use this
powerful and effective tool with less frequency in the future.24
.V. CONCLUSION: REINING IN CONSPIRACY
Standing alone, the criminal conspiracy doctrine casts a very wide net, indeed.
Increasingly, though, it does not stand alone, but instead it becomes an even more potent
force when combined with substantive crimes and new statutory devices such as
RICO.249 RICO raises special concerns because, when joined with traditional conspiracy
doctrine, it creates a remarkably broad and vague new offense, agreeing to engage in
enterprise activities.
In a recent drug case Judge Jones of the Sixth Circuit discussed his fear of the
wide conspiracy net, though this fear would be just as applicable to other commonly
charged conspiracy matters, such as fraud, weapons, or financial claims:
Furthermore, I have a growing fear that casting a conspiracy net will
become a catch-all method charging anyone caught in the vicinity of
illegal drugs. Such a catch-all could then be used to convict purely
innocent persons, albeit unintentionally. The government's burden of
proof is not lessened when cocaine is involved.25 °
Judge Jones' uneasiness, while important, has been with us for many years. Certain
features today, however, make the conspiracy offense a matter of intense concern. The
crime now is charged quite often. It allows for joinder of offenses and parties into giant
"mega-trials." To some it now appears easier to gain convictions of individual, non-
essential parties.2z ' And the punishment for the convicted conspirator has become
severe in terms of both the agreement itself and other crimes allegedly committed in
furtherance of it.
247 Letter from Schroeder, supra note 48.
248 Letter from Flannery, supra note 77.
249 In almost no major RICO case involving more than one defendant (by the very terms of RICO
there must be multiple parties) would the RICO charge stand alone; at least one conspiracy charge and
sometimes many more would be present. See, e.g., United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991)
(the well-publicized prosecution of the "Westies" gang in New York).
250 United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 351 (6th Cir.) (Jones, J., dissenting), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct.
2038 (1990).
251 Reading the cases, one is struck by the broad language that the courts use to affirm convictions of
individuals who make claims based upon their own respective, individual culpabilities. See, e.g., United
States v. Keats, 937 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 399 (1991) (allowed for conspiracies based
upon the defendants' link with unknown co-conspirators); United States v. Juarez-Fierro, 935 F.2d 672, 677
(5th Cir. 1991) (held that all elements may be shown by circumstantial evidence and that even "circumstanc-
es altogether inconclusive, may, by their number in joint operation ... be sufficient to constitute conclusive
proof'); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 844 (7th Cir. 1991) (held that individual conspirators do not
need to know or participate in "'every detail of the conspiracy, or to know all the conspiracy's members"').
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It is time to refocus attention on the crime of conspiracy, particularly on the
reason for having such a joint endeavor offense. The offense exists, as the Supreme Court
and many others have stated repeatedly, because of a deep concern with the danger
created by the joint activity of serious and determined criminals.252 To that end, let us
go beyond the somewhat trivial arguments concerning individual culpability and
responsibility with theories such as the unilateral approach and the elimination of the
consistency rule; instead let us concentrate on deterring and punishing group conduct. Let
us develop a heightened need for government showings of intent for individuals to join
together and of combined efforts of individuals to become a true danger to the
community. The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Townsend? 3 stated the point
concisely and well:
Learned Hand described the conspiracy charge as the "darling of the
modern prosecutor's nursery." Its attraction has not diminished with the
passage of years; nor, consequently, has the need for courts to harken
back to the basic principles underlying conspiracy liability when
reviewing closely the evidence supporting such charges.254
The conspiracy offense should be used to punish groups of people for joining
together to commit crimes. This seems a basic and somewhat modest proposition. This
goal can be achieved best by insuring that defendants receive careful attention individually
and not as part of a set of twenty to fifty defendants. It can also be achieved if it is the
conspiracy which is punished and not other crimes, albeit related. For those other crimes
ample mechanisms exist for punishment, including traditional accountability principles and
other substantive offenses. It is time to rein in the conspiracy crime so that it serves its
true purpose and does not become a basis for challenging the fairness and process of our
criminal justice system.
252 The trial judge in United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 725 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) was
so taken with the group danger notion that he instructed the jury about it:
In the portion of the conspiracy charge to which the defendants object, the district
judge stated that conspiracy poses "a greater potential threat to the public interest than
the illegal activity of a single individual since it often makes possible the attainment of
ends more complex than those which an individual acting alone could accomplish."
Defendants claim that this statement biased the jury against them. However, it was
well within the district judge's discretion to attempt to clarify the meaning of conspira-
cy for the jury, and the district court's definition is almost identical to a description of
conspiracy given by the Supreme Court.
Id.
253 924 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1991).
254 Id. at 1416 (citation omitted),(quoting Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925)).
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